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AFIT-ENS-MS-17-M-149 
 
Abstract 
 
Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) play a vital role in present day operations due to 
their asset capability and ability to reduce risk to pilots’ lives. A complex supply chain 
network capable of producing and integrating all raw materials, components, sub- 
systems, and systems supports the successful acquisition of a UAS. Such a complex 
network is supported by vital supply chain decisions. Two important decisions regarding 
supply chain design include supplier selection and optimal flow of material and products. 
Whether a decision maker wishes to design or interdict a supply chain, the methodology 
developed in this thesis provides a suite of tailorable models to facilitate these vital 
decisions. Linear programming and generalized network flow models that incorporate 
goal programming are developed to integrate the decision maker’s priorities. In addition, 
a targeting matrix employing a House of Quality approach is developed to provide an 
interdiction planning team with a decision support tool that facilitates interdiction 
strategy planning. Overall, the different models developed in the study provide modeling 
flexibility. The incorporation of goal programming into supply chain network design and 
interdiction allows decision makers to effectively frame their supply chain decisions. 
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Analyzing the Critical Supply Chain 
For Unmanned Aicraft Systems 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
“Time is passing. Yet, for the United States of America, there will be no forgetting 
September the 11th.” 
-President George W. Bush 
(“A Nation Challenged; ‘No Isolation From Evil,’ Bush Declares,” 2001) 
 
1.1 Background 
 
September 11, 2001 forever changed our great nation. Although it is a decade and 
a half later, the United States (U.S.) is still facing the implications of the terrorist attacks 
that occurred that day. This thesis integrates two of those implications: the rise of 
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) technologies’ role in military operations and the 
profound effects that a supply chain disruption can have on the manufacturing and 
availability of a product. 
The military usage of UAS has risen as a direct result of the 9/11. In fact, armed 
UAS were first sent into Afghanistan on September 12, 2001 (Gettinger et al., 2014), just 
one day after the attacks. In Afghanistan and the surrounding areas, UAS enable the U.S. 
fight by providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) as well as a strike 
capability, in order to understand and defeat its enemies. UAS offer a significant benefit 
by removing the operator from harm’s way while still providing the same, and in some 
cases superior, capabilities that a manned aircraft offers. For example, some UAS can 
stay aloft for longer durations than would be expected of crewed aircraft. 
The U.S., however, is not the only country seeking this advantage; international 
military proliferation of UAS continues to grow. It is estimated that, due to the rising 
number of indigenous producers and growing international market, it will become 
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common for more countries to possess armed UAS in the next five to ten years (Sayler, 
2015). This proliferation of UAS poses a dangerous problem, because “the falling cost 
threshold of drone technology increases the possibility of drones falling into terrorist 
possession” (Gettinger et al., 2014), a prophetic observation which may already be true. 
With this possibility evolving into an ever-increasing threat, the U.S. government has a 
vested interest in sustaining their air superiority. This can be accomplished not only by 
ensuring their own UAS superiority, but also by impeding this advantageous capability 
from falling into the wrong hands. 
9/11 is also an example of the effects of an extreme disturbance in a supply chain. 
 
The attacks created such a disruption that almost no supply chain nationwide went 
unharmed; this was mainly due to the U.S. immediately closing down its airspace and 
tightening border control, as well as the infrastructure and firms that were impacted at the 
site (Rice et al., 2003). Manufacturing firms were particularly impeded severely. Ford, a 
major U.S. automobile manufacturer, shut down five of its U.S. production plants due to 
a shortage of supplies (Rice et al., 2003). While the 9/11 attack is a drastic example, it 
exemplifies that idea “that supply chain disruptions are unavoidable” and therefore “that 
all supply chains are inherently risky”(Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, and 
Handfield, 2007). 
To tie these two implications together, consider the importance of a UAS supply 
chain. The Department of Defense (DoD) defines a supply chain as “the linked activities 
associated with providing materiel from a raw materiel stage to an end user as a finished 
product” (“Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 2016). 
Therefore, the supply chain includes activities such as procurement of materials, 
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manufacturing of parts, integration of components, final system assembly, and delivery to 
the warfighter. In the case of the U.S.’ own UAS supply chains, it is vital that all entities 
involved in its supply chain are resilient to disruptions to ensure this capability is readily 
available. In the case of adversarial UAS supply chains, it is valuable for the U.S. to 
know how to cause such a disruption that could potentially devastate the supply chain and 
disrupt the system production, thereby preventing its use against the U.S. or its allies. At 
a minimum, if prevention is not possible, creating an impactful delay or a reduction of 
capabilities is desired. In either case, a critical analysis of a UAS supply chain is a 
powerful tool to leverage to gain insight into the vulnerabilities in the supply chain of 
interest. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
The purpose of this research is to provide a suite of scalable models to both 
develop a friendly supply chain and to propose attack vectors for an opposition’s supply 
chain. The framework allows the analyst the ability to investigate an array of options and 
suggest an opposition’s most likely course of actions. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
This research answers the following questions: 
 
1. How can an analyst model optimal UAS supply chain design? 
 
2. How can an analyst model the best UAS supply chain interdiction? 
 
3. How can a decision maker strategize UAS upply chain interdiction? 
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1.4 Research Focus 
 
The focus of this research includes both the optimal design and optimal 
interdiction of supply chains of UAS. However, the methodology and models apply to the 
design and interdiction of any type of supply chain. While an ideal model would include 
all aspects of the supply chain, the complexity and data requirements are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The methodology and models proposed, however, can be applied to a 
full supply chain if that data is made available. This research effectively demonstrates the 
utility of the approach. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
 
This research presents a holistic supply chain interdiction model (SCIM), 
complete with optimal design with regard to supplier selection and flow of materials, and 
optimal interdiction for the criteria stated. Goal programming models are developed to 
first model the supply chain tasks that must be accomplished and the manufacturer’s 
optimal decisions in doing so, then to subsequently model the attacker’s decision to 
disrupt the supply chain. This applies to both supplier selection and flow of materials. 
The models provide enough flexibility to allow adaptation to different levels of fidelity of 
the supply chain, based on the user’s mission objectives and available data. A House of 
Quality decision support tool is developed to assist a decision maker in planning a supply 
chain interdiction campaign. The full supply chain interdiction methodology is 
demonstrated on an illustrative example. 
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1.6 Assumptions/Limitations 
 
The main assumption underlying this research is that an attacker has knowledge 
and data about the structure of the supply chain of interest that it wishes to interdict. If 
this assumption is not met, then it is assumed that the supply chain is designed optimally, 
according to a set of priorities. Therefore, some information must be known about either 
the structure of the supply chain itself, or the objectives of the owner’s of the supply 
chain. It is also assumed that goals and priorities can be defined in order to utilize the 
goal programming models. However, if a decision maker has a single objective, the 
models in this research can be tailored accordingly. A limitation arises if these 
assumptions are not met, and the models developed may not lead to optimal interdiction 
if the data or priorities are unknown or incorrect. 
 
1.7 Implications 
 
The models presented in this research can be utilized from two different 
perspectives of the supply chain decision-making spectrum. From a friendly supply chain 
perspective, a supplier selection goal program enables a supply chain manager to choose 
an optimal set of suppliers and optimal flow of materials to design an effective and 
efficient supply chain. This model also aids an opposing decision maker who wishes to 
disrupt a supply chain by targeting suppliers. If a supply chain supplier set is unknown, a 
decision maker in opposition to a supply chain can utilize the model to estimate the 
supplier set from which they can choose to target. 
Joint Publication 3-60 (2013) states that “targeting is the process of selecting and 
prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering 
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operational requirements and capabilities” This research supports the second phase of the 
joint targeting cycle (shown below in Figure 1) target development and prioritization. 
Target selection requires a delicate balance between competing objectives. Maximizing 
benefits implies having the greatest desired impact on the enemy; in a supply chain, this 
translates to the most effective supply chain disruption while limiting collateral damage. 
However, target selection comes at a cost, whether it be a financial burden, operational 
risk, or political sensitivity. 
 
 
Figure 1. Joint Targeting Cycle 
 
An optimal supply chain interdiction methodology facilitates the target 
development phase by building a method to critically assess the state of any supply chain. 
It allows a commander to identify vulnerabilities in a supply chain of interest’s 
production process and supplier base. It does not answer the question of “how” to disrupt 
(or reinforce, depending on decision maker’s position) a supply chain, but rather leads to 
“where” in the supply chain to focus. The “how” is ultimately left up to the planner and 
the commander during the third and fourth stages of the joint targeting cycle. The 
1. End State and 
Commander's 
Objectives 
6. Assessment 
2. Target 
Development and 
Prioritization 
5. Mission 
Planning and 
Force Execution 
3. Capabilities 
Analysis 
4. Commander's 
Decision and 
Force Assignment 
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methodology presented utilizing a House of Quality approach does, however, provide a 
method in which the commander and staff can begin to consider the question of “how” to 
exploit (or fortify) vulnerabilities identified by the model. 
 
1.8 Overview 
 
In Chapter 2, a literature review introduces key concepts and reviews the previous 
research, all of which set the foundation for the remaining chapters and is vital to 
understanding the topic. In Chapter 3, we develop the full supply chain design and 
interdiction methodology that includes a model to determine an optimal supplier set, a 
model to optimally interdict a supply chain, a solution methodology, and a decision 
support model to support targeting and planning operations. Chapter 4 demonstrates the 
models, reports the results, and discusses the implications and extensions. Finally, 
Chapter 5 summarizes the research and suggests options for future research. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter provides the reader with an overview of the fundamental concepts 
underlying this research. This is accomplished by surveying the relevant literature. 
Section 2.2 develops a basic understanding of supply chains. Section 2.3 gives an 
overview of the design and supply chain of unmanned aerial systems. Sections 2.4 and 
2.5 introduce the modeling techniques used in this research. Section 2.6 then surveys 
previous research that apply these techniques. Section 2.7 introduces the interdiction 
aspect of supply chains. Finally in Section 2.8, the House of Quality is introduced. These 
sections provide the framework of the methodology developed in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2 Supply Chain Overview 
 
Although the DoD defines a product’s supply chain only as activities from its 
beginning stage to finished product, the overall supply chain includes more than just the 
production activities and does not conclude with a finished product. Christopher and Peck 
provide a more thorough description defining it as “the network of organizations that are 
involved … in the different processes and activities that produce value in the form of 
products and services in the hands of the ultimate consumer” (“Supply Chain Operations 
Reference (SCOR) model,” n.d.). Therefore, the supply chain not only includes all 
processes that encompass the phases of the systems’ life, from product design, to 
production, operational life, sustainment, and even onto its retirement, but each the 
organization performing those processes, or tasks, involved along the way. 
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The Supply Chain Operations Reference (SCOR) model is the standard 
management model utilized in industry to evaluate and improve supply chain operations. 
SCOR describes five top-level processes: Plan, Source, Make, Deliver, and Return. 
Figure 2 illustrates the infrastructure of a supply chain based on this SCOR model, 
including all entities involved in a supply chain, such as suppliers, manufacturers, and 
customers. 
Figure 2. SCOR Model (Huan, Sheoran, and Wang, 2004) 
 
Each entity has a supply chain of its own, hence the intra supply chain model, 
while the collective group of entities forms the inter supply chain. 
As defined in the SCOR model, the main processes that all entities perform are 
Plan, Source, Make, and Deliver. Source processes include the ordering, scheduling, and 
receipt of products. Decisions in the Sourcing processes include which suppliers to 
choose and the volume of materials or products to buy from suppliers based on the 
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demand determined during the initial process, called the Planning process. The Make 
processes define all the tasks related to the conversion of materials into a product. This 
includes the production or manufacturing of a product. During the Make process, 
materials from downstream suppliers are converted into products for use upstream in the 
supply chain. As a product moves up the supply chain, value is being created along each 
phase. Decisions during the Make processes include how to perform and schedule tasks. 
One particularly imperative decision during the Make process includes whether to “Make 
or Buy”, also known as “Insource versus Outsource”. Quality, flexibility, control issues, 
cost, and other factors all present considerations in deciding the insource versus 
outsource issue. Manufacturing companies, when determining their strategic fit into a 
supply chain, must decide whether a product, or a component of a product, is in their best 
interest to make on their own or buy from an outside source who may be able to produce 
a better product and/or do so at a lower cost than the could do internally. Finally, once the 
full value of a product is realized in the Make processes of the supply chain, the product 
is delivered to the next upstream entity and eventually to the customer. During the 
Deliver processeses, a customer’s order is fulfilled. An interdiction at the Delivery phase 
(i.e., after a finished good is completed), if feasible, would disrupt the supply chain with 
the added benefit of having had a foe expend critical time, resources, and effort. The 
Deliver process includes the physical transportation of the product from one stage of the 
supply chain to the next. 
According to the SCOR model, a supply chain’s effectiveness should be evaluated 
with respect to five core performance attributes. These attributes, Reliability, 
Responsiveness, Agility, Costs, and Assets, all respectively have associated metrics that 
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allow for comparison to facilitate decision making during the supply chain processes. 
Reliability addresses the ability of supply chain entities to complete tasks up to standard; 
measures for this attribute track considerations such as quantity, quality, and order 
fulfillment rates. Reliability can be measured on an entity or the product itself. 
Responsiveness addresses the speed at which entities provide products upstream, 
therefore measures for responsiveness are related to time. Agility is the ability of the 
supply chain entity to respond to outside impacts. This attribute, while vital, is difficult to 
measure but includes both flexibility and adaptability. Agility relates to supply chain 
resilience, which will be defined later in detail as it is an important characteristic. The 
Cost attribute includes all expenses associated with performing the supply chain 
processes such as labor, material, management, and transportation costs. Finally, the 
Asset attribute is the supply chain entities’ ability to efficiently utilize resources. Supply 
chain assets include inventory, utilization, and insourcing versus outsourcing, all of 
which have associated metrics. 
While each of the process areas, Plan, Source, Make, and Deliver, provide 
opportunities for analysis and improvement in the supply chain according to their 
respective attributes and metrics, they also provide areas of focus for an attacker wishing 
to disrupt a supply chain. For example, in the Sourcing process, a company must evaluate 
their potential suppliers and decide which ones are the best for their purposes. Often such 
a decision requires a balance between measures—for example quality and cost. The 
manufacturer must prioritize these attributes and make decisions that support those 
priorities. Most often, specifically in the aerospace industry, suppliers must be certified 
according to their respective standards, and it is the achievement of certification that 
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qualifies them to be considered an option. These key supply decisions give room for an 
attacker to make interdictions decisions as well; they may wish to disrupt a 
manufacturer’s supply chain by affecting the company’s supplier base. Likewise, an 
attacker targeting a manufacturer contemplating a “Make or Buy” decision may wish to 
force them to a less than desirable decision. Alternatively, an attacker may wish to target 
the Delivery process by diverting, interdicting, or disrupting the transportation or flow of 
materials. 
A critical analysis of a supply chain aims to identify key characteristics of the 
supply chain such as risks, vulnerabilities, and susceptibilities—all of which lie within 
any of the processes in the SCOR model. Depending on the role of the decision maker, 
the analysis can be utilized to create a more resilient supply chain (if the supply chain of 
interest is their own) or to identify potential supply chain disturbances (if the supply 
chain of interest is a foe’s). These characteristics of a supply chain are defined as follows 
for clarity. 
Supply chain risk: The effect of uncertainty at any point in the end-to-end supply chain, 
including sustainment and maintenance, on its objectives. The magnitude of supply chain 
risk may be measured along three dimensions: likelihood of occurrence, expected 
consequences, and duration. (Adapted from (Moore and Loredo, 2013)) 
 
Supply chain vulnerability: The characteristics of a supply chain that cause it to suffer a 
definite degradation (incapability to perform the designated mission) as a result of having 
been subjected to a certain level of effects in an internal, external, or unnatural (man- 
made) hostile environment. (Adapted from (“Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms,” 2016)) 
 
Supply chain susceptibility: The degree to which a supply chain is open to effective 
attack due to one or more inherent weaknesses (Adapted from (“Mandatory Procedures 
For Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS) and Major Automated Information 
(MAIS) Acquisition Programs,” 2001)) 
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Supply chain resilience: The supply chain's ability to effectively and efficiently return to 
its original or move to a new, more desirable state after being disturbed (Adapted from 
(Christopher and Peck, 2004)) 
 
Supply chain disturbance: An event that degrades the normal flow of goods and materials 
within a supply chain in terms of a defined metric (i.e. cost, lead time, etc) (Adapted from 
(Craighead et al., 2007)) 
 
Based on these definitions, it follows that a supply chain interdiction aims to 
cause a disturbance that targets supply chain risks and vulnerabilities. In other words, it 
seeks to exploit supply chain susceptibilities. A resilient supply chain will either have 
fewer risks or susceptibilities for an interdiction to target, or it will be well suited to 
recover quickly if a disturbance does occur. The methodology and models in this research 
are all ways in which to assess these characteristics of a supply chain –vulnerability, 
susceptibility, and resilience—and perform an internal capabilities’ assessment to 
determine the best course of action to interdict or disturb the target by leveraging the 
supply chain’s risks. 
 
2.3 Unmanned Aerial Systems: Design and Supply Chain 
 
Fundamental to developing a UAS supply chain model, a general understanding of a 
UAS design is required. UAS are made of a number of sub-systems. The main sub- 
systems of a general UAS are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Unmanned Aerial System Design (Austin, 2010) 
 
The control station functions as the control center of the UAS operation. It is where 
the human-system interface occurs; the operator communicates to and controls the UAS 
from the control station, and the UAS communicates by responding and sending 
information to the operator. The control station is an element of the UAS that is different 
from the control station in traditional aircraft, because the human-system interface with 
the control system in a traditional aircraft occurs in the aircraft itself with the pilot. 
The payload of a UAS is specifically carried to achieve its mission. It can be 
considered in two basic types: non-dispensable payloads, such as the sensors, cameras, 
and so forth, which remain with the aircraft, and dispensable payloads, such as armament 
(Austin, 2010). The payload chosen for each UAS, therefore, depends on its operational 
mission and task, as well as the platform’s capabilities. There is a vast array of payloads 
available. 
The air vehicle is the actual aircraft, whose purpose is to carry the payload and all 
other sub-systems. The air vehicle includes the design of the fuselage, the engine and 
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propulsion system, the wings, and all aspects regarding airframe aerodynamics. Again, 
the design and performance of the air vehicle is dependent upon the operational mission 
of the UAS (Austin, 2010). The air vehicle, in production, is typically referred to as the 
airframe. 
The navigation systems allow the operators and aircraft to know where it is at all 
times. This is made possible by technology such as inertial navigation systems (INS), 
global positioning systems (GPS), or other tracking mechanisms such as radar tracking, 
radio tracking, and direct reckoning systems (Austin, 2010). The type of navigation 
depends on the level of autonomy of the UAS as well as the acceptable risk level (in case 
GPS is in danger of being blocked). 
The communications system provides the data links between the control station and 
the UAS. Most often, the transmission occurs through radio frequency, but other 
alternatives exist as well. The complexity, weight, and cost of the communications 
system (in terms of electrical power and antennae design) is determined by the range of 
operation of the air vehicle from the transmitting station, the sophistication demanded by 
transmission-down of the payload and housekeeping data, and the need for security 
(Austin, 2010). Small UAS often do not require complex and expensive communications 
system, but as the size, range, and operating altitude of the UAS increases, so too does 
the complexity of the communications system. 
The sub-systems just described are all physical considerations of the UAS itself, 
excluding the control station. The launch, recovery, and retrieval equipment are not 
physically part of the UAS and are only required if the UAS is not capable of vertical 
flight or is not man-portable. The most important aspects of the UAS are its interfaces, 
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both internal to the UAS that ties all sub-systems together and external to the UAS, which 
allows it to communicate with outside entities. Interfaces allow interoperability and 
ultimately support the success of the UAS mission. Internally, sub-systems acting as a 
standalone objects would preclude the UAS from operating; externally, UAS acting 
standalone may or may not be successful, mission dependent. 
Support equipment and transportation are the last two considerations of the UAS 
design. Support equipment includes all equipment required to operate and maintan the 
UAS, from manuals to tools to spares (Austin, 2010). Transportation, whether 
accomplished on its own or by carrier vehicles, allows the UAS mobility and may require 
a crew. Though not physically part of the UAS design, these considerations are an 
important aspect to UAS success and of its supply chain. 
Due to the design and complexity of the UAS, a supply chain structure that 
supports the production of a final product composed of many components, 
subcomponents, and assemblies is necessary. For this reason, the aerospace industry 
typically utilizes a “tiered” supply chain. Suppliers are classified on a tiered system, 
whereas the tasks they perform are classified by levels. This creates a hierarchy of 
suppliers and tasks that is common to the structure of a UAS supply chain. Commonly, 
there are at least three main tiers of suppliers that perform the four main levels of tasks. 
Tier One suppliers typically interact directly with the airframe and aircraft manufacturers, 
called Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), and provide them with the final parts 
needed to assemble an aircraft. OEMs perform the Level 1 task of assembling the aircraft 
with these final parts. These parts include the major sub-systems such as the aero 
structure, the avionics systems, engines, landing gears, actuators, and other complex 
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components and assemblies made of many subcomponents and subassemblies (ATC 
Aerospace, 2014); the production of these sub-systems are known as Level 2 tasks. Tier 
Two suppliers produce the same types of parts as Tier One suppliers, but instead they 
supply their products to Tier One suppliers. Tier Two suppliers receive their supplies 
from Tier Three suppliers, who typically manufacture the components and parts 
necessary to complete the subsystems, which comprises Level 3 and below tasks. Tier 
Three suppliers rely on smaller suppliers and raw materials suppliers to provide the 
necessary material and parts to assemble the components. 
With this structure, a UAS supply chain can be conceptualized as a series of tasks, 
according to their level, performed by manufacturers, with a selection of suppliers from 
which to choose that provide the materials necessary to complete those tasks. In Figure 4, 
the tasks are represented by blue nodes, arcs represent task precedence (i.e. Level 4 tasks 
must be accomplished before Level 3 tasks, and so forth). The levels of tasks and tiers of 
suppliers depends upon the size and complexity of the UAS. 
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Figure 4. Typical UAS Supply Chain Structure 
 
The suppliers, shown as the red nodes, are responsible for accomplishing the necessary 
tasks for their individual products. Moving from left to right Figure 4, materials flow 
from downstream to upstream in the supply chain. The final integration, Level 1 tasks, 
occurs through the OEM. A detailed tasks list for a generic U.S. military UAS, down to 
Level 4 tasks, is defined in the Work Breakdown Structures for Defense Material Items 
document, MIL-STD 881C, Appendix H. The full task list is available in Appendix A of 
this document. These tasks would represent the blue nodes shown in Figure 4. 
 
2.4 Mathematical and Goal Programming Overview 
 
Mathematical programming is an approach to mathematically represent a problem 
which seeks to discover the best allocation of limited resources to find an optimal 
solution subject to some constraints. Analyzing this definition, the phrase “seeks to 
discover” implies a set of decisions to be made, the phrase “best allocation” alludes to an 
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optimal solution, and the phrase “limited resources” implies a constrained environment. 
The main parts of a mathematical programming model (math model) are a set of decision 
variables, an objective function or functions to be optimized, and a set of constraints. 
The decision variables are the factors that the decision maker can control. 
 
Typically, they answer the question of “how many” resources to allocate to a certain 
course of action, but they can also be a binary “yes” or “no” (represented as 1 or 0, 
respectively) answer to whether or not to allocate resources to a course of action. The 
objective function incorporates the decision variables to define the best allocation of 
interest to the decision maker. The objective function is either maximized or minimized. 
Common examples include maximizing profit or minimizing cost. Finally, the constraints 
are equations that model the resource limitations of the decision variables. (If an 
organization had unlimited resources, there would be no need for a model at all!) For a 
model with strictly linear constraints, the model is called a linear program (LP). A 
general LP is developed below: 
Minimize: n 
Z = ∑c jx j 
j =1 
(i) 
Subject to: 
 
n 
∑ aijx j ≥ bi , for i=1, ..., m, 
j =1 
(ii) 
 
x j ≥ 0, for j=1, ..., n, (iii) 
 
where x1, x2 ,..., xn are the decision variables, and c1, c2 ,..., cn are the contribution 
 
coefficients of each decision variable to the objective function value, Z. In constraints (ii), 
 
aij are known as the technological coefficients and represent the resource usage of each 
 
decision variable of the right-hand-side coefficient of bi (Schniederjans, 1995). This 
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research will utilize different classes of linear programs to represent characteristics of 
supply chains. 
Linear goal programming is a special application of linear programming. The two 
approaches differ slightly in the setup of both the objective function and the constraints. 
Whereas traditional linear programs seek to precisely optimize a single objective, goal 
programming seeks to fulfill multiple objectives that are often in conflict; where 
traditional approaches use absolute constraints, goal programming recognizes that, with 
multiple objectives all constraints are likely not to be simultaneously attainable, the 
objective instead minimizes deviations from a prespecified level (Schniederjans, 1995). 
Therefore, a general linear goal program (GP) from (Schniederjans, 1995) is shown as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where d + and d − are the positive and negative deviation variables measuring the over- 
i i 
 
attainment of a goal or its under-attainment, respectively. Notice that the objective 
function includes a choice of deviation variables that are associated with the decision 
maker’s goals and priorities. These goals and priorities can be preemptively weighted so 
that each goal is absolutely more important than the next, or they can be nonpreemptively 
(numerically) weighted so that all priorities share a weighted importance (Schniederjans, 
Minimize: Z = ∑ w (d + + d −) i i i 
i∈m    
(iv) 
Subject to: 
 
n 
∑ a x  − d + + d − = b , for i=1, ..., m, ij    j i i i 
j =1 
(v) 
 
d +, d −, x  ≥ 0, for i=1, ..., m; for j=1, ...,n, 
i i j 
(vi) 
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1995). This general model is built upon in Chapter 3 to model supply chain goal 
programming applications. 
 
2.5 Network Flows Introduction 
 
A common way to represent and analyze supply chain networks is a problem 
domain known as network flow models. These types of models traditionally yield insight 
into how to optimally traverse a network with respect to such objectives as distance 
(shortest path problem), volume (maximum flow problem), or cost (minimum cost 
network flow problem). The problem of interest in this research is the minimum cost 
network flow (MCNF) model. A general representation from Bazaara (Bazaraa, Jarvis, 
and Sherali, 2010) is shown below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where xij are the decision variables which represent the amount of flow to pass through 
 
each arc (i,j) with lower and upper bounds of lij and uij respectively, cij are the cost per 
 
unit of flow across arc (i,j), and bi is the demand at each node. The objective function 
(vii) minimizes the cost of the flow passed through the system, and the constraints in 
(viii) are known as the flow conservation constraints and they ensure that total flow out 
of a node i, ∑ xij , minus the total flow into a node i, 
i, j∈A 
∑ xji , equals the net supply at 
j ,i∈A 
 
the node (Bazaraa et al., 2010), hence the conservation of flow. If bi =0, node i is an 
intermediate node, meaning all of the flow that enters the node also leaves the node. If bi 
> 0, node i sends positive net flow out into the network, a supply node; often times this is 
Minimize: Z = ∑ cijxij 
i, j∈A 
(vii) 
Subject to: ∑ xij − ∑ x ji = bi , for i ∈ N , 
i, j∈A j ,i∈A 
(viii) 
 
lij ≤ xij  ≤ uij∀(i, j) ∈ A, (ix) 
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the first node, known as the source. When bi <0, that node has a net demand that must be 
satisfied. 
This notion of flow relates to a supply chain because materials flow through the 
 
supply chain network through a series of suppliers and manufacturers. Each manufacturer 
converts the products they receive from the previous supplier into another product, often 
smaller in quantity. For example, Manufacturer X may convert 4 units of a sub-widget 
from their previous supplier into a single widget to pass forward to the next supplier. This 
feature lends itself to a generalized network flow problem, also known as a network flow 
with gains (or losses) (Bazaraa et al., 2010). Network flows with gains are useful for 
many different formulations. Hamill (2007) utilized a generalized network flow problem 
with gains or losses to model social networks as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where the only addition of g ji  reprents gain (>1) or loss (<1) of material flowing through 
 
a node. Within the context of material flows through a supply chain, the generalized 
network allows the represesentation of conversion of materials into various parts, 
components, sub-systems, and systems as they pass through the supply chain. 
 
2.6 Previous Research and Models 
 
As shown in Figure 4 and according to the SCOR model, suppliers are deeply 
integrated in and extremely important to the supply chain process. Supplier selection is a 
Minimize: Z = ∑ cijxij 
i, j∈A 
(x) 
Subject to: ∑  xij −  ∑ g jix ji = bi , for i ∈ N , 
j:(i, j )∈A j:( j ,i )∈A 
(xi) 
 
lij ≤ xij  ≤ uij∀(i, j) ∈ A, (xii) 
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critical factor in determing whether a supply chain will be successful or not. When a 
manufacturer is choosing its suppliers, there are many important considerations that 
inform their decisions. Liao and Kao suggest that some of the most important factors 
include quality, price, and delivery lead time (Liao and Kao, 2010). Other notable 
considerations include performance history, warranties policies, technical capability, 
financial stability, expertise, reputation, and experience. Overall, quality is generally 
considered the most decisive factor (Weber, Current, and Benton, 1991). 
There has been a great deal of research regarding the issue of optimal supplier 
selection. Liao and Kao develop a supplier selection method that integrates Taguchi loss 
functions, analytical hierarchy process (AHP), and multi-choice goal programming 
(MCGP) (Liao and Kao, 2010). In their model, the Taguchi loss functions quantify 
supplier deviation from specifications, AHP is utilized to prioritize manufacturer goals 
according to metrics, and ultimately these values are used as input to a MCGP to 
determine a set of optimal suppliers. Lee, Kang, and Chang present a similar approach 
that utilizes “fuzzy” AHP that analyzes the importance of multiple criterion (such as cost, 
yield, and number of suppliers) and use MCGP to facilitate supplier selection (Lee, Kang, 
and Chang, 2009). 
Ghodsypour and O’Brien develop a decision support system that integrates AHP, 
to address the qualitative factors, with linear programming, to address the quantitative 
factors of supplier selection (Ghodsypour and O’Brien, 1998). They use AHP to rate 
suppliers based on a set of weighted criteria such as cost, quality, and service. Their AHP 
values then inform a linear program (LP) that includes any resource (supply and demand) 
or quality constraints and determines a set of optimal suppliers. 
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Similar to AHP, Gencer and Gurpinar (2007) develop an analytical network 
process (ANP) model that accounts for the dependencies between decision criteria in 
supplier selection. Their selection criteria include the business structure, manufacturing 
capability, and product quality of potential suppliers. 
Overall, most of the research regarding supplier selection seems to agree that the 
decision process is multi-objective, often with objectives that compete with each other. 
Many utilize AHP to determine the relative importance of criterion when selecting 
suppliers. While AHP is widely used, it has theoretical problems to be aware of, such as 
rank reversal, aggregation, a large number of necessary pairwise comparisons, and the 
limitations of an artificial scale (Kasperczyk and Knickel, 2004). Most research also 
utilize the attributes and measures suggested by the SCOR model to inform their models. 
Once an optimal set of suppliers is selected, it is up to the attacker to determine 
how to optimally interdict these tasks. Due to the network-like structure of supply chains, 
we survey network interdiction literature to explore the concepts. Network interdiction 
has applications in many various fields including communications networks, supply 
networks, drug networks, and project networks. 
Wood (1993) uses deterministic network interdiction to model an interdictor, with 
limited resources, that wishes to minimize an enemy’s maximum flow through a 
capacitated network. The model and its variants are setup as bi-level min-max integer 
programming (IP) problems, in which the enemy and interdictor have equal but opposite 
objective functions. The same problem is modeled stochastically by Cormican et al 
(1998). In contrast to deterministic interdiction, where the interdiction variables are 
assumed to be binary indicating either a completely successful or a completely 
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unsuccessful interdiction, the stochastic model incorporates the idea of uncertain 
interdiction. This allows for partially successful interdictions and analysis on the effects 
of such. The model and its variants, like those of Wood’s, are setup as a bi-level min-max 
problems. 
Another application of bi-level network interdiction was developed by Brown et 
al. (2007). The objective of their research was to model interdiction of a nuclear-weapons 
project by maximally delaying completion time of the project. The bi-level model is a 
max-min problem, in which a nuclear weapon proliferator wishes to minimize completion 
time by following the Critical Path Model principles used in the project management 
field in scheduling tasks according to time and precedence constraints. The interdictor 
then wishes to determine which  tasks to interdict in order to maximally delay the project. 
As previously mentioned, an alternative way to model a supply chain is to view it 
as a flow of materials and goods through a network in which, at each progressive stage, 
the materials get more and more refined until it results in a final product. Just as supplier 
selection decisions often has multiple objectives, this network flow of goods can likewise 
have multiple, often competing, objectives. Calvete and Mateo (1995) considered the 
network flow problem with multiple objectives by applying it to a hydrological system to 
determine an optimal way to distribute water in a water system. They used preemptive 
priorities to rank the goals, which included demands and other features of the system. The 
solution approach they proposed included network-based algorithms such as out-of-kilter 
and primal-dual algorithms (Calvete and Mateo, 1995). In further research, Calvete and 
Mateo consider a lexicographic generalized network flow problem, and develop another 
network based primal-dual algorithm: Lexicographic Generalized Primal-Dual (Calvete 
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and Mateo, 1998). McGinnis and Rao (1977) present a particularly interesting application 
of goal programming in networks in their research. They formulate goal programming 
versions of classical network flow models and develop an efficient solution methodology 
that exploits the network structure of the problem by using Lagrangian relaxation . The 
models and solution approaches proposed in all of these applications can be directly 
applied to a supply chain, especially the solution techniques when dealing with large- 
scale problems. 
In his research, Kallemyn (2015) develops a suite of network interdiction models 
that can applied to these types of network flow problems. In fact, Kallemyn develops 
interdiction models for maximum flow models and shortest path models, both of which 
are easily adaptable into MCNF problems. 
The models in Chapter 3 incorporate all of these concepts to model optimal 
supply chain design and interdiction. By taking the priorities and goal programming 
methods developed in supplier selection literature and combining with network flow and 
network interdiction approaches, a suite of supply chain interdiction models are 
developed that can be tailored to the mission objectives of an interdiction scenario. 
 
2.7 Supply Chain Interdiction Considerations 
 
While models for supply chain interdiction developed in this research will provide 
targets for an attacker, they do not focus on the “how” behind disrupting a supply chain. 
Additional decision support tools are necessary to determine an actual interdiction 
strategy that meets mission objectives. A knowledge of common inherent supply chain 
risks gives a decision maker the ability to consider different courses of action. Extensive 
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research has been accomplished on the types of risks that supply chains encounter, due to 
factors such as globalization and terrorist attacks that have exposed the effects of supply 
chain vulnerabilities. The main categories of risk identified in the literature include 
supply risks, operations (operational) risks, environmental risks, and financial risks. 
Supply risk is defined as “the probability of an incident associated with inbound 
supply from individual supplier failures or the supply market occurring” (Zsidisin, 2003). 
They encompass any risk found “in the course of movement of materials from supplier’s 
suppliers to focal firm” (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Supply risks also includes the 
supplier themselves; their credibility, business operations, and dependability. Other 
supply considerations include single versus multi-sourcing, quality issues, and product 
complexity (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Therefore, interdictions targeted at supply risks, 
for example, could be directed at suppliers to create logistics delays, introducing 
counterfeits into their supply system, targeting the transportation network (especially if it 
is global), or target suppliers’ inventory management. 
Operational risk as defined by the Basel Committee (2004) is “the risk of loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems or from 
external events. This definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational 
risk”. Although the definition of operational risk derives from the financial realm, it is 
well suited for supply networks because it “reflects the complexity, uncertainty and 
diversity of risk sources that are valid for supply networks” (Heckmann, Comes, and 
Nickel, 2015). Interdictions intended for operations risks can target specific tasks, such as 
the production of a single critical component, part, or raw material. They can also target 
the people performing the labor of the supply chain operations. An example would be 
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launching an informations operations campaign to encourage workers to go on strike or 
scare them into refusing to work. 
Environmental risks break down further into sub-categories and are somewhat all- 
encompassing. They can be considered from a business environment, market 
environment, or physical environment standpoint. The business environment includes 
government actions and regulations, while the market environment includes items such as 
raw materials availability, little or no competition, or cost trends (Moore and Loredo, 
2013). The physical environment includes natural disasters that may adversely disrupt 
transportation or production such as hurricanes, fires, and earthquakes. The environment 
can be internal to the supply chain, such as operations within and controlled by the 
business, or external to the supply chain, such as government regulations, natural 
disasters, or terrorist attacks. Interdictions aimed at environmental risks can target any 
one of the environments mentioned in a variety of ways. An attacker might target disaster 
mitigation options, for example. 
Financial risks “refers to deviations of expected monetary objectives” (Heckmann 
et al., 2015). This includes both the suppliers’ and customers’ financial status, and the 
costs associated with the production, procurement, transportation, and logistics of the 
product. Finally, interdictions aimed at financial risks can target areas in the supply chain 
which are very costly to overcome. They might also target a group’s financial resrouces 
or available credit. 
While most supply chains face similar risks, the aerospace and defense (AandD) 
industry, under which military UAS fall, face additional common issues. Verify, a 
prominent U.S. supplier performance management firm, outlined the four main 
35  
challenges that a global AandD supply chain face as export control and compliance, 
quality infusion in product life cycle, assuring quality product is delivered on-time, and 
skilled resource availability (Mcintosh, 2012). Additional research (Ghadge, Samir Dani, 
and Kalawsky, n.d.) argues that the main risks in an aerospace supply chain are due to 
global sourcing, a diverse supplier base, market volatility, and product complexity. 
These are also important considerations specific to UAS supply chain interdiction. A 
summary of these and other risks from the literature are shown in Figure 5 and can assist 
a decision maker in framing interdiction strategies. All of these risks are inherent in 
supply chains and are potential targeting options. 
 
 
Figure 5. Common Supply Chain Risks 
 
2.8 House of Quality Introduction 
When a decision maker knows “where” a supply chain is susceptible or has 
vulnerabilities, they can then develop a strategy to address “how” they wish to cause a 
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disturbance by considering ways to target these risks. A method that is seemingly 
unrelated but that can be used in supply chain interdiction by an attacker decision maker 
is an adaptation to what is called the “house of quality” (HOQ). HOQ is used primarily in 
the design process of products called Quality Function Deployment (QFD) by a team of 
engineers, marketers, and designers of a company, and its goal is to match product design 
with customers’ needs (Temponi, Yen, and Tiao, 1999). A typical HOQ model is shown 
in Figure 6. It defines the “what” (customer attributes or needs) and relates them to the 
“how” (technical requirements), with the rest of the house detailing the relationship 
between these categories. 
 
 
Figure 6. House of Quality (Temponi et al., 1999) 
 
Hauser and Clausing (1988) present a description of how to build a house of 
quality. For each box (a)-(i) shown in Figure 6, they provide a description that the team 
must contemplate and answer in order to build the house. The descriptions from (Hauser 
and Clausing, 1988) are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. House of Quality Description 
 
 
Section of House of Quality Description 
(a) Customer Attributes What do customers want? 
(b) Customer Assessment Will delivering perceived needs yield a competitive 
advantage? 
(c ) Importance Are all preferences equally important? 
(d) Technical Requirements How can we change the product? 
(e) Relationship Matrix How much do engineers influence customer-perceived 
qualities? 
(f) Correlation Matrix How does one engineering change affect other characteristics? 
(g) Target Values Establish ideal new measures for each technical requirement 
(h) Technical Assessment Objective measures related to each technical requirement 
(i) Weights Relative weights of technical requirements 
 
 
The House of Quality approach, while primarily a business-centric tool, can be 
applied to many other types of decision making processes. For example, Kimbrough 
(2008) contructed a House of Quality that compared U.S. military irregular warfare 
doctrine publications to provide insights to doctrine writers by determining critical 
concepts to consider. Using the same principles, the House of Quality approach can be 
applied to supply chain network interdiction decisions to develop a targeting screening 
matrix. The decision maker, i.e. the commander and his or her planning staff, must 
determine a “what” (a set of optimal targets) and a “how” (the courses of action and 
capabilities) to develop a strategy that supports achieving a desired disruption. Based on 
these concepts and approaches, a full targeting adaptation of HOQ is developed in 
Chapter 3. 
 
2.9 Summary 
 
The sections in this chapter have set the foundation for the development of the 
models in this study. A discussion of supply chains and UAS set the foundation for the 
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focus of this research. A discussion of goal programming and network flow models were 
introduced to familiarize the reader with the models developed in Chapter 3. Previous 
research on supplier selection goal programming and network interdiction models was 
surveyed for a background of the work done in these areas. Finally, the House of Quality 
was discussed to introduce the concepts that are utilized in the final model in Chapter 3. 
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3. Methodology 
 
 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter develops the formulations to the supply chain interdiction 
methodology, SCIM, and present solution approaches. Section 3.2 begins by introducing 
the methodology, and continues to formulate each of the sub-models and steps that 
comprise SCIM. 
 
3.2 Supply Chain Interdiction Methodology 
 
The supply chain interdiction methodology (SCIM) consists of three phases. A 
visual overview is presented in Figure 7. In Phase 1, SCIM-Design, allows an interdictor 
to model an optimal supply chain, in the case that the supply chain design is unknown or 
unavailable. The supply chain is modeled two ways, one as a linear program to identify 
optimal supplier selection and one as an optimal network flow model to emulate the flow 
of materials through a supply chain. In Phase 2, SCIM-Interdiction, models optimal 
interdiction of both types of the models in Phase 1. The advantage that the network flow 
model provides is that any of the network flow interdiction models available can be 
utilized. Here, we utilize goal programming to develop a model for interdiction. For each 
model in SCIM-Design, there is an associated interdiction model. Lastly, in Phase 3, a 
targeting screening matrix is developed utilizing a House of Quality approach. 
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Phase 1: 
SCIM- 
Design 
 
• OEM Supplier Selection (SS) 
• Supply Chain Network Flow (SCNF) 
 
 
Phase 2: 
SCIM- 
Interdiction 
 
• Supplier Selection Interdiction (SS-I) 
• Supply Chain Network Flow Interdiction (SCNF-I) 
 
Phase 3: 
SCIM- 
Strategize 
 
 
• House of Targeting (HOT) 
 
 
 
Figure 7. SCIM Phases and Models 
 
Phase 1: SCIM-Design: OEM Supplier Selection Model (SS) 
 
As suggested in the literature review, a decision maker wishing to disrupt a supply 
chain can consider several areas to affect. The first model proposed, OEM Supplier 
Selection (SS), focuses on the Sourcing Process from the SCOR model and utilizes goal 
programming. The OEM Supplier Selection Goal Program models the optimal supplier 
choices that an OEM would select, in order to create a supplier set from which an 
attacker can interdict in Phase 2. This first model, however, is unnecessary if an existing 
supplier selection set is known. If a supplier selection set is unknown, this model 
demonstrates an optimal supplier selection decision and supply chain design. Therefore, 
consider a UAS OEM that must choose a set of suppliers from which to purchase their 
Level II tasks, or sub-systems. For this development, it is assumed that the OEM’s 
priorities are likely to minimize total cost and product lead time and also maximize 
product reliability, which are all reasonably derived from both the supplier selection 
literature as well as common metrics from the SCOR model. It is assumed the producer 
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has a budget they wish to stay under, an overall product reliability they wish to achieve, 
and a production schedule they wish to meet. Of course, if intelligence is available to 
suggest other priorities, these can also be modeled—or a single objective can likewise be 
modeled.The equations for the model will each be developed as follows and then 
compiled at the end. 
We define yis to be a binary decision variable that equals 1 if task i is supplied by 
 
supplier s, and 0 otherwise. These two sets of tasks and suppliers are defined as follows: 
 
i ∈ I where I = All tasks to be performed i = 1, 2,..., n 
S =  set of all possible suppliers; 
where s ∈ S (i) when s = {1, 2,..., m} is able to perform task i 
 
The first constraint ensures that at least one supplier is chosen for each task, as 
shown in Equation (1). 
 
 
 
This equation states that for each task i, at least one yis must be equal to 1. 
 
Before formulating the goal constraints, a value for each goal must be determined. 
 
The goal is defined by a target, which is “an acceptable level of achievement for any of 
the attributes considered by the decision maker” (Romero, 1991). Therefore, the goal is 
interpreted as a certain level of attainment, or aspiration level, that the decision maker 
reasonably wishes to achieve for each priority. Care must be taken to define the goals 
appropriately in order to correctly specify the model, which suggests that some 
information or data must be known about the goal. A more accurate specification of the 
∑ yis ≥ 1,   ∀i ∈ I 
s∈S (i )   
(1) 
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∏∏  r = R 
is total 
is total 
goals’ aspiration levels leads to a better understanding and interpretation of the models’ 
results. 
Once goals and aspiration levels have been defined, the constraints can be 
constructed. For the purpose of discussion, it will be assumed that the OEM has the 
following goals in order of preference: cost, reliability, and due date (lead time). Of 
course, if some other priorities are known, they can be used. The next constraint focuses 
on the OEM’s first priority of attaining an optimal cost. Each task i and supplier s has an 
associated cost, defined as cis . With a budget aspiration level of B, the cost constraint is 
defined by Equation (2). 
 
 
 
C + and C − measure the goal attainment. If C + is zero, the constraint is within budget, 
and if C + has a positive value, then the constraint is over budget. If C − has positive 
value, the constraint will be below budget. 
Similarly, each task i and supplier s has an associated reliability, defined as ris . 
 
Assuming independence, the total reliability, Rtotal , of all suppliers across all tasks is: 
 
yis 
is total 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
 
This, however, violates the linearity necessary for linear programming constraints. To 
 
conserve the linearity, the following logarithmic transformation is made: 
 
− ln(∏∏ r yis ) = − ln(R ) 
i∈I s∈S (i )   
 
∑ ∑ − ln(r yis ) = − ln(R ) 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
∑ ∑ c  y  + C − − C + = B is    is 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
(2) 
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∑ ∑ yis (− ln(ris )) = − ln(Rtotal ) 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
 
Therefore, with a reliability aspiration level of P, the reliability constraint is defined by 
Equation (3). 
 
 
 
The incorporation of n accounts for the number of estimated decisions, i.e. number of 
tasks as defined in the set. For example, if eight tasks are to be completed and the 
reliability aspiration, P, is 90% or 0.90, the right hand side of Equation (3) would be 
−8 ln(0.90) ; this allows for the development of a suitable goal level. 
 
Note here that using the negative natural log reverses the logic for reliability. 
 
While normally an OEM would choose a supplier with a higher reliability, this 
corresponds to a lower value after being transformed. Therefore, if R+ is zero, the 
constraint meets the reliability aspiration level, but if it has positive value, then the 
reliability falls short of its goal. If R− has value, the reliability exceeds its the goal. It is 
also important to keep in mind with this transformation is that, wheras the reliability 
values for all ris and  P are on a negative log scale, the deviation variables of R
− and R+ 
 
are not. This makes interpreting the results more difficult, but gauging the magnitudes of 
 
R− and R+ will provide an idea of whether the OEM is above or below its reliability goal. 
Following the same approach as the cost constraint, for each task i and supplier s 
with associated production lead time tis with aspired schedule time of D, and with the 
 
deviations for the desired due date given as T − and T + , the lead time constraint is 
defined by Equation (4). 
∑ ∑ y (− ln(r )) + R− − R+ = −n ln(P) is is 
i∈I  s∈S (i )   
(3) 
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∑ ∑ t y  + T − − T + = D is    is 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
(4) 
 
Equation (5) defines the non-negativity of the objective function decision 
variables and defines the supplier selection decision variables to be binary. 
 
 
It should be noted that, while the model has been proposed with primarily goal 
constraints (also known as soft constraints due to the deviation variables), it could include 
hard constraints (i.e., classic inequality constraints). 
The optimal solution to the OEM Supplier Selection Goal Program, according to 
these constraints, identifies a set of suppliers that allows an OEM to best meet its 
manufacturing and production goals.These goals reflects their priorities: cost, reliability, 
and production time. These priorities are not limited to just cost, reliability, and time, but 
they rather can be defined as any number of measures. They are utilized in this model as 
an example. Following the nature of goal programming, each priority defined as cost, C, 
reliability, R, and time, T, has an aspiration level of P, B, and D, respectively. Therefore, 
the goals C, R, and T have associated deviation variables, C +, C −, R+, R−,T +, and T − , that 
represent the over- and under- deviations of decision-based metrics from their respective 
aspiration levels. We assume that cost is the first priority and assign it an appropriately 
developed weight of W1 , followed by reliability with weight W2 , with time as the third 
priority with a weight of W3 . 
A brief discussion on weighting is appropriate before the goals are defined—these 
 
weights can be developed in many ways, as long as they appropriately reflect the decision 
maker’s priorities. Ignizio (1976) points out that there is no single correct approach to 
C +, C −, R+, R−,T +,T − ≥ 0 ; y  ∈{0,1} 
is 
(5) 
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1 1 
assigning weights, priorities and ranks. They need not be preemptive, only appropriately 
and soundly weighted numerically. According to Romero, a naïve weighting of the goals 
can lead to a meaningless interpretation of the goal program; therefore the proper setting 
of the weights is imperative. The author suggests several approaches to overcome naïve 
weighting, such as scaling the weights according to their goals or normalizing weights 
according the a Euclidean norm (Romero, 1991). Other suggested approaches include 
swing weighting (Parnell and Trainor, 2009), polynomial weighting (Deckro and Hebert, 
1988), or other normalizing techniques. Whether numeric or preemptive weighting is 
used, it is important that the weights are developed in a justifiable manner that overtly 
represents the decision maker preference for deviations from the aspiration level. 
Sensitivity analysis in the weights is often recommended. A sound weighting technique 
will keep the model consistent and produce meaningful interpretations. 
With that discussion, the first goal for SS can be identified as: 
 
Minimize WC + − ε C − 
 
Here, minimizing C + ensures that costs do not exceed the budget. Since, according to 
Equation (5), all variables are non-negative, the optimal value for C + is zero. The goal is 
satisfied when the solution is within budget. Any solution that meets the budget is 
optimal for the goal attainment. A small value of  −ε1 is added to the function, alongside 
C − , to allow the option of selecting a solution, if it exists, that not only meets the goal 
but exceeds it (in this case, being under budget). The value for ε1 should be selected to 
reflect the decision without interfering with the goal satisfaction (see (Sherali and 
Soyster, 1983) for a discussion on preemptive versus nonpreemptive weighting). 
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2 2 
3 3 
Likewise, the second goal—maximizing supplier reliability—can be defined as: 
 
Minimize W  R+ − ε R− 
 
Here, remember that the logic is reversed due to the logarithmic transformation discussed 
in Equation (3), so minimizing R+ is actually equivalent to maximizing reliability. 
Because smaller values of Rtotal are more desirable than larger ones, an optimal value of 
 
R+ is zero, while a larger value of R− leads to a reliability in excess of the goal. 
 
Lastly, the third goal—minimizing production lead time—can be defined as: 
 
MinimizeW T + − ε T − 
 
The whole objective function is then defined in the following expression: 
 
Minimize WC + + W R+ + W T + − ε C − − ε R− − ε T − 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
 
While the objective function features multiple objectives, it can also be modeled as a 
single objective linear programming model. The complete SS model is compiled as 
follows: 
 OEM Supplier Selection Goal Program, SS  
Minimize WC + + W R+ + W T + − ε C − − ε R− − ε T − 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
 
Subject to ∑ yis ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ I , 
s∈S (i )   
(1) 
 
∑ ∑ c  y  + C − − C + = B, is    is 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
(2) 
 
∑ ∑ y (− ln(r )) + R− − R+ = −n * ln(P), is is 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
(3) 
 
∑ ∑ t y  + T − − T + = D, is    is 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
(4) 
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C +, C −, R+, R−,T +,T − ≥ 0 , 
 
yis ∈{0,1} ∀i ∈ I , s ∈ S (i). 
(5) 
 
The variables and sets are defined as: 
 
Decision 
Variables y   = 
1 if task i is supplied by supplier s 
is    0 otherwise 
 
Sets i ∈ I I = All tasks to be performed i = 1, 2,..., n 
S =  set of all possible suppliers; 
where s ∈ S (i) when s = {1, 2,..., m} is able to perform task i 
Data ris = measure of reliability of task i 
when performed by supplier s 
cis = cost of task i when performed by supplier s 
tis = measure of time for task i when performed by supplier s 
B = total cost goal (budget) for the manufacturer 
P = manufacturer's total product reliability goal 
D = production time goal (schedule) 
for the manufacturer 
Wk = Priority weight of goal k for k = 1...g 
where g is the number of goals 
εk = some small positive scalar 
Variables R+ = overage of reliability aspiration level, P 
 
R− = underage of reliability aspiration level, P 
 
C + = overage of price/cost aspiration level, B 
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C − = underage of price/cost aspiration level, B 
T + = overage of production time aspiration level, D 
T − = underage of production time aspiration level, D 
 
Phase 1: SCIM-Design: Supply Chain Network Flow 
 
Instead of selecting specific suppliers, consider a supply chain network consisting 
of a flow of materials and goods from raw material to delivered finished goods. This 
network can be modeled as a graph of nodes and arcs, G(N,A), wherein a node represents 
a transformation of materials from its downstream nodes into a product and sent upstream 
to the next level of nodes. These nodes can be conceptualized as manufacturers 
performing work for each level of task, just as in the supplier selection problems; 
however, instead of simply choosing which supplier from which to purchase material, the 
manufacturer must determine how much materials they need to perform their task in 
order to meet demand and from where to purchase it. This is a classic network flow 
model, and is especially useful for manufacturers considering the “Make or Buy” 
decision previously discussed during the the Make phase of the SCOR model. To model 
the “Make or Buy” decision, multiple nodes can be defined for each task: one 
representing the “Make” node, and the others representing the “Buy” node from the 
number of available suppliers. 
 
In the Supply Chain Network Flow (SCNF), the decision variables,  fij , denote the 
 
amount of flow on the arcs between nodes i and j. To capture the reduction in amount of 
material from one level of task to the next (the assembly of parts into a component), a 
“loss” coefficient,  lij , is defined for the generalized network flow extension. If lij <1, the 
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flow decreases, if lij >1, flow increases, and if lij = 1 , flow passes through the node 
unchanged. Each flow has an upper bound,  uij , representing the arc’s supply capacity 
from node i to node j. The network flow utilizes a flow balance equation for a generalized 
network flow with losses, defined by Equation (6) as: 
 
∑ fij −  ∑ l ji f ji ≤ bi   ∀i ∈ N 
j:(i, j )∈A j:( j ,i )∈A 
(6) 
 
where i is a supply node with supply bi 
 
<0), or an intermediate node (if bi  = 0 ). 
(if bi >0), a demand node with demand  bi (if bi 
 
An addition to the SCNF model is the introduction of demand. A manufacturer 
has a demand that they wish to achieve, which led to the desire to determine the optimal 
flow of material. The demand constraint can be viewed as a hard constraint in the 
manufacturer’s model—it is unlikely they will buy more than they need, but they must 
meet at least the demand. This constraint is covered by Equation (6) for the last node of 
the network, with demand  bi that will at the very least be met. If, in the solving of this 
 
model, the instance infeasible, it is likely that demand cannot be met and one might 
consider adjusting their demand accordingly. 
Next, Equation (7) constrains the flow to be a positive number between zero and 
its upper limit, uij , or capacity: 
0 ≤ fij ≤ uij    ∀(i, j) ∈ A (7) 
 
The lower bound here is assumed to be zero, but it can be defined as a positive number, if 
known and applicable. 
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For the illustration of the SCNF model, it is again assumed that the decision 
maker has priorities of minimizing cost, maximizing reliability, and minimizing time. 
Any single goal or set of goals and priorities may be used. Given these priorities, the 
SCNF can also be setup as a goal program, similar to the Supplier Selection model. For 
the goal constraint corresponding to the first goal, minimizing cost, cij is defined to be 
 
the cost to flow one unit of flow, fij , from node i to node j. With a budget goal of  B , and 
 
over- and under- deviations from cost of C + and C − , respectively, Equation (8) reflects 
the first goal’s constraint: 
 
 
 
Similarly, the second objective has reliability goal of  P , and over- and under- 
 
deviations of  and  R− . The reliability of sending one unit of flow,  f  , from node i to 
ij 
 
node j, is rij . Utilizing the same logarithmic transformation from Equation (3), the 
reliability goal constraint can be formulated as shown in Equation (9): 
 
 
The n in Equation (9) is defined by the estimated number of components that will flow 
through the system. In terms of the manufacturer, it is an estimation of the materials 
necessary to build their product. 
Finally, the third goal is minimizing production lead time to meet a schedule, D. 
The schedule has over- and under- deviations of T + and T − , respectively. The time it 
takes one unit, fij , to flow from node i to node j,is given by tij . The time goal’s constraint 
is shown in Equation (10). 
∑ c  f  + C − − C + = B ij    ij 
i, j∈A 
(8) 
 
∑ f (− ln(r )) + R− − R+ = −n ln(P) ij ij 
i, j∈A 
(9) 
 
51  
∑ t f  + T − − T + = D ij    ij 
i, j∈A 
(10) 
 
It is important to note the units in this model. The data ( cij , rij , and tij ) correspond to a 
 
single unit of flow, fij . For example, if it is known that a shipment of 500 units from 
 
node i to node j will be $10,000, then c  would be $10, 000 = $20 / unit . 
 
ij 500 
Because goal programming is employed in SCNF, all deviation decision variables 
must be non-negative, as defined by Equation (11). 
Since the goal weighting for the SCNF model example are assumed to be the 
same as the SS model, the objective function remains the same.Therefore, the full SCNF 
model formulation for the design of flow of materials is shown below. 
Supply Chain Network Flow Goal Program 
Minimize WC + + W R+ + W T + − ε C − − ε R− − ε T − 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
 
Subject to ∑ fij −  ∑ l ji f ji ≤ bi  , ∀i ∈ N , 
j:(i, j )∈A j:( j ,i )∈A 
(6) 
 
0 ≤ fij ≤ uij    ∀(i, j) ∈ A, (7) 
 
∑ c  f  + C − − C + = B, ij    ij 
i, j∈A 
(8) 
 
∑ f (− ln(r )) + R− − R+ = −n ln(P), ij ij 
i, j∈A 
(9) 
 
∑ t  f + T − − T + = D, ij    ij 
i, j∈A 
(10) 
C +, C −, R+, R−,T +,T − ≥ 0. (11) 
C +, C −, R+, R−,T +,T − ≥ 0 (11) 
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Phase 2: SCIM-Interdiction: Attacker’s Supplier Selection Interdiction (SS-I) 
 
Phase 2, SCIM-Interdiction transitions to the attacker’s point of view. Phase 1 is 
only necessary if a supply chain is unknown due to lack of intelligence. For the attacker’s 
supplier selection interdiction (SS-I) model, the focus is on determining which supplier(s) 
makes the most effective target and will cause the most detrimental effects. Whether a set 
of suppliers is determined using the OEM’s model (SS) from Phase 1, or it is already 
known, that set is the set of potential targets for an attacker wishing to cause a 
disturbance. Perhaps, an attacker wishes to drive up cost and production lead time, and 
reduce product reliability; these are in contrast to the OEM’s goals in the SS model. Or, 
perhaps, the attacker has their own set of objectives, such as keeping the interdiction 
costs under a budget. Just as in the SS model, any set of goals and priorities can be 
determined for this model. It should also be noted that a single objective would work as 
well. The objective depends upon the mission objectives of the attacker. Along with 
solving for optimal supplier interdiction, a model that simultaneously indicates where the 
OEM’s next best option lies would offer more insight for the attacker when deciding 
attack strategies. 
Supplier Selection Interdiction (SS-I), incorporates two sets of decision variables 
for the two entities involved in the interdiction process: the attacker performing the 
interdiction and the OEM adjusting their supplier selection according to the disruption. 
The new decision variable for the attacker, xis  is defined to be 1 if task i supplier s is 
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is 
u 
is u 
is disrupted, 0 otherwise. The OEM’s decision variable is now y
'  , where '    = 1 if 
 
supplier s is chosen to complet task i, and zero otherwise (i.e., yis = 1 in SS) . The set of 
suppliers is divided into two subsets, defined as follows: 
Su  is subset of suppliers chosen (yis = 1) in OEM's original problem 
(or the set of suppliers already known) and therefore eligible for disruption; 
S c  is subset of suppliers not chosen (yis = 0) in OEM's original problem; 
Su ∩ Suc  ⊆ S (i). 
 
First, the constraints for SS-I are formulated. Equation (12) is the same as 
Equation (1) in the SS model; it ensures each task is accomplished by selecting a supplier 
for each one. 
 
 
 
Equation (13) specifies that for each task, the attacker can only choose to disrupt 
from the set of suppliers the OEM had previously selected, and if that supplier task 
combination is interdicted, the OEM can only choose from the new set of suppliers. 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
 
y'  -variables on the left-hand side of Equation (13) are only from the set 
 
s ∈ S c (i) , 
 
which was defined as the set of suppliers not chosen in the original SS model (or the set 
of suppliers currently not being utilized by the supply chain but available as options, if 
already known without solving the SS model). Equation (13) stipulates that a new 
supplier, y' , from this set of suppliers not yet utilized can only be chosen for task i, if xis 
y 
is 
∑ y'  ≥ 1,   ∀i ∈ I is 
s∈S (i )   
(12) 
 
∑  y 'is ≤  ∑ xis ,  ∀i ∈ I 
s∈S  c (i ) s∈Su (i )   u 
(13) 
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u 
u is 
' 
is chosen for disruption (i.e., set to a value of 1). Otherwise, the set of potential suppliers 
must remain at a value of zero to hold the inequality. 
Equation (14) ensures that a supplier can only be interdicted if it was previously 
 
chosen by the OEM in the SS model. For each task/supplier combination, xis can only be 
 
“turned on” or set to 1, if y is is 1. Otherwise, xis  must be zero to hold the inequality. 
 
x  ≤ y' , ∀i ∈ I , s ∈ S 
is is 
(14) 
 
Equation (15) incorporates the interaction between the interdiction and supplier selection 
variables and forces the supplier to choose a new supplier if its original supplier is 
interdicted to ensure that each task i still gets accomplished. 
 
 
 
 
If  xis =1, task i supplier s is interdicted, and supplier s is no longer eligible to be chosen to 
 
complete task i. 
 
Equations (16)-(18), defined below, are nearly the same as Equations (2)-(4), 
 
except that, for the set of suppliers that were chosen ( s ∈ S (i) ) in the SS problem, y is 
 
is replaced by y' is − xis to ensure a supplier task combination is “turned off” (set to zero), 
 
if interdicted. Therefore, for the set s ∈ S  (i) , y'  = 1 originally, but will be offset in 
 
Equation (15) if the arc is interdicted, i.e., the corresponding xis -variable is set to 1. 
 
These equations are included into the attacker’s model for two reasons. First, they allow 
the attacker to evaluate the effect that their decisions will have on the OEM’s original 
goals by comparing with the results from the SS model. Second, it also allows the 
∑ ( y'  − x ) ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ I is is 
s∈S (i )   
(15) 
 
55  
attacker to model the behavior of the OEM and gain insight into the OEM’s future 
supplier selection decisions if the attacker interdicts their best option. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The constraints up to this point in SS-I have dealt with the OEM and attacker interacting 
with each other. SS-I assumes that the attacker is aware of an OEM’s priorities and 
supplier options, and that the OEM becomes aware of an interdiction when it occurs and 
can switch its supplier selection accordingly. 
The following constraints reflect only the point of view of the attacker. Assume, 
for each supplier and task, that an attacker can estimate the cost of an attack (denoted 
c _ attackis ), as well as the potential “damage” they can cause (denoted as dis ). Damage 
can be defined in any way the interdictor can measure it. It is important to note that some 
form of consistent metric is developed for the damage coefficients. There are many ways 
to assess the value of a target, and notably the most important aspect to any approach is 
that the values are valid and reproducible. While the development of such values is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, approaches such as value hierarchy or analytical 
hierarchy processes are solid frameworks with which to start (the reader is referred to 
(Saaty, 1982)  or (Keeney, 1992) as an example). For demonstration purposes, damage 
∑ ∑ c  ( y  − x  ) +∑ ∑ c  ( y  ) + C − − C + = B is is is is is 
i∈I   s∈Su (i ) i∈I   s∈Suc (i )   
(16) 
∑ ∑ ( y  − x  )(− ln(r )) +∑ ∑  ( y  )(− ln(r )) + R− − R+ = −n ln(P) is is is is is 
i∈I  s∈Su (i ) i∈I  s∈Suc (i )   
 
(17) 
∑ ∑ t  ( y   − x  ) +∑ ∑  t  ( y  ) + T − − T + = D is is is is is 
i∈I   s∈Su (i ) i∈I   s∈Suc (i )   
(18) 
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will be defined on a 1-10 scale with 10 being catastrophic damage, and 1 being minimal 
damage. 
The attacker’s objective is to cause the most damage at the least cost. The attacker 
 
defines an interdiction budget goal, Cattack , and a “damage” goal,  Dattack , with associated 
 
over- and under- deviation variables. Equation (19) incorporates the interdiction budget 
goal for the attacker. 
 
 
 
Equation (20) reflects the attacker’s “destruction” goal, where dis indicates the 
amount of damange an interdiction causes on task i supplier s. 
 
 
 
Because the attacker’s constraints are goals with large weights on their priorities, 
the optimal solution will naturally suggest that they interdict all of the targets. To restrict 
the attacker to a realistic scenario, we introduce a hard constraint that limits the number 
of attacks or interdictions they can perform, r. This limit is shown in Equation (21). 
 
 
 
The value of r will depend on the mission objective and resource capabilities. 
Equations (22) defines binary constraints for decision variables, and non-negativity for 
the deviation variables. 
∑ ∑ c _ attack  x + C − − C + = C is   is attack attack goal 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
(19) 
 
∑ ∑ d  x  + D − − D + = D is   is attack attack goal 
i∈I  s∈S (i )   
(20) 
 
∑ ∑ xis ≤ r 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
(21) 
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+ 
attack 
y' ∈{0,1} , x ∈{0,1} ∀i ∈ I , s ∈ S (i), 
is is 
 
 
C +, C −, R+, R−,T +,T −, D+ , D− , C + , C − ≥ 0 
attack attack attack attack 
(22) 
 
Finally, the SS-I objective function, defined in the following expression, reflects the 
 
attacker’s objective: to minimize the overage cost of interdiction,  Cattack   , and underage 
 
of damage, D − . The rest of the objective function reflects the OEM’s objective 
 
function from the original SS problem and is necessary to ensure that the model suggests 
where the OEM’s next optimal move would be, given the interdiction by the attacker. 
Minimize W C + + W D− − ε C − − ε D+    + W C + + W R+ + W T + 
1 attack 2 attack 1 attack 2 goal 3 4 5 
 
Therefore, the full model, Supplier Selection Interdiction (SS-I) is formulated as follows: 
 
Attacker’s Supplier Selection Interdiction Goal Program, SS-I 
Minimize W C + + W D− − ε C − − ε D+    + W C + + W R+ + W T + 
1 attack 2 attack 1 attack 2 goal 3 4 5 
 
Subject to ∑ y'  ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ I , is 
s∈S (i )   
(12) 
 
∑  y'  ≤  ∑ x  ,  ∀i ∈ I , is is 
s∈S  c (i ) s∈Su (i )   u 
 
(13) 
  
x  ≤ y ' , ∀i ∈ I , s ∈ S, 
is is 
(14) 
 
∑ ( y '  − x ) ≥ 1,  ∀i ∈ I , is is 
s∈S (i )   
(15) 
 
∑ ∑ c  ( y'  − x  ) +∑ ∑ c  ( y' ) + C − − C + =B, is is is is is 
i∈I   s∈Su (i ) i∈I   s∈Suc (i )   
 
(16) 
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∑ ∑ ( y'  − x  )(− ln(r )) +∑ ∑  ( y'  )(− ln(r )) + R− − R+ = −n ln(P), is is is is is 
i∈I  s∈Su (i ) i∈I  s∈Suc (i )   
(17) 
∑ ∑ t  ( y'  − x  ) +∑ ∑  t  ( y'  ) + T − − T + = D, is is is is is 
i∈I   s∈Su (i ) i∈I   s∈Suc (i )   
 
(18) 
∑ ∑ c _ attack  x + C − − C + = C , is   is attack attack goal 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
 
(19) 
∑ ∑ d  x  + D − − D + = D , is   is attack attack goal 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
 
(20) 
∑ ∑ xis ≤ r , 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
 
(21) 
y' ∈{0,1} , x ∈{0,1} ∀i ∈ I , s ∈ S (i), 
is is 
 
 
C +, C −, R+, R−,T +,T −, D+ , D− , C + , C − ≥ 0 . 
attack attack attack attack 
 
(22) 
 
The variables and sets are primarily the same as the OEM supplier selection model, but 
the new variables and sets introduced are defined below. 
Decision 
Variables x   = 
1 if task i supplier s is targeted for interdiction 
is    0 otherwise 
 
Sets Su is subset of suppliers chosen (yis = 1) in OEM's original problem; 
S c  is subset of suppliers not chosen (y   = 0) in OEM's original problem; 
u is 
Su ⊆ S (i) and Suc  ⊆ S (i)  
Data c _ attackis = cost to attacker to disrupt task i for supplier s 
 
dis = damage caused by interdiction on task i supplier s 
 
Cgoal = interdiction cost (budget) aspiration level 
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' 
 Dgoal = interdiction destruction goal 
 
Variables 
r = upper limit on number of interdiction attacks 
 
+ = overage of interdiction budget aspiration level, C Cattack goal 
  − = underage of interdiction budget aspiration level, C Cattack goal 
 
D + = overage of interdiction destruction goal, D 
attack goal 
 
D − = underage of interdiction destruction goal, D 
attack goal 
 
Phase 2: SCIM- Interdiction: Supply Chain Network Flow-Interdiction 
Just as SCNF was similar to SS, likewise Supply Chain Network Flow-Interdiction 
(SCNF-I) is also similar to SS-I. Because SCNF has a classic network flow structure, 
existing interdiction models based on networks can be utilized for planning an attack. 
SCNF-I is an interdiction approach utilizing goal programming. SCNF-I begins by 
utilizing the structure of SCNF, and incorporates interdiction by using the same approach 
as SS-I and dividing the solution set from SCNF into arcs chosen ( Au ), and arcs not 
 
chosen ( Auc ). The new decision variables in SCNF-I are f ij , the new flow over arcs 
 
(i,j), and , the interdiction over arcs (i,j). The new flow balance interdiction constraint 
is shown in Equation (23): 
 
∑  ( f '  − x ) −  ∑  l  ( f '   − x  ) +  ∑ ( f '  ) −  ∑ l  ( f '  ) ≤ b , ∀i ∈ N ij ij ji ji ji ij ji ji i 
j:(i, j )∈Au j:( j ,i )∈Au j:(i, j )∈A c j:( j ,i )∈A c u  u 
(23) 
 
This constraint follows the same logic as Equation (6), and essentially allows flow to pass 
through a node only if it is not fully disrupted. A node is considered fully disrupted if 
x  = f ' . Otherwise, if 0 < x  ≤ f ' , the flow from node i to node j is only partially 
ij ij ij ij 
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disrupted, and in essence its capacity is decreased. With regard to an arc’s capacity, 
Equation (24) ensures an arc can only be interdicted if flow is passing through it, and it 
establishes an upper bound, , on both the flow and the interdiction. 
 
The goal constraints in this example of SCNF-I are split into subsets of arcs utilized ( Au ) 
and arcs unchosen ( Auc ) from the orginal SCNF-I model. They are formulated below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These are nearly identical to the goal constraints in Equations (16)-(18) in SS-I, with the 
appropriate notation and subscripts applicable to SCNF. The variables are all defined as 
they were in SCNF. 
The final constraints in SCNF are nearly identical to those in SS-I, with the appropriate 
set notation, and they represents the attacker’s goals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Just as in SS-I, we also introduce a limit on the number of attacks based on mission 
objectives and resource constraints, shown in Equation (30) 
0 ≤ x  ≤  f '   ≤ u , ∀(i, j) ∈ A 
ij ij ij 
(24) 
 
∑ c ( f '  − x ) + ∑  c ( f '  ) + C − − C + =  B ij ij ij ij ij 
j∈Au (i ) j∈A c (i )   u 
(25) 
∑ ( f '  − x  )(− ln(r )) + ∑  ( f '  )(− ln(r )) + R− − R+ = −n ln(P) ij ij ij ij ij 
j∈Au (i ) j∈A c (i )   u 
(26) 
∑ t  ( f '  − x ) + ∑ t  ( f '  ) + T − − T + =  D ij ij ij ij ij 
j∈Au (i ) j∈A c (i )   u 
(27) 
 
∑ c _ attack  x + C − − C + = C ij   ij attack attack goal 
(i, j )∈A 
(28) 
∑ d  x  + D − − D + = D ij   ij attack attack goal 
(i, j )∈A 
 
(29) 
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∑ xi, j ≤ r 
i, j∈A 
(30) 
 
 
Finally for the constraints, the deviation variables are defined to be non-negative in 
Equation (31). 
C +, C −, R+, R−,T +,T −, C +, C −, D +, D − ≥ 0 
attack attack attack attack 
(31) 
 
The objective function in SCNF-I is identical to the SS-I model. However, as noted 
before, the objective can be specified however the decision maker deems appropriate, and 
can be multi- or single- objective. The objective function is restated to complete the 
formulation. 
Minimize W C + + W D− − ε C − − ε D+    + W C + + W R+ + W T + 
1 attack 2 attack 1 attack 2 goal 3 4 5 
 
Therefore, the final SCNF-I formulation is shown below. 
 
 Supply Chain Network Flow-Interdiction Goal Program  
Minimize W C + + W D− − ε C − − ε D+    + W C + + W R+ + W T + 
1 attack 2 attack 1 attack 2 goal 3 4 5 
 
Subject to 
  
∑ ( f '  − x  ) −  ∑ l  ( f '   − x  ) +  ∑ ( f '  ) −  ∑ l  ( f '  ) ≤ b , ∀i ∈ N , ij ij ji ji ji ij ji ji i 
j:(i, j )∈Au j:( j ,i )∈Au j:(i, j )∈A c j:( j ,i )∈A c u  u 
(23) 
0 ≤ x  ≤  f '   ≤ u , ∀(i, j) ∈ A, 
ij ij ij 
(24) 
∑ ( f '  − x  )(− ln(r )) + ∑  ( f '  )(− ln(r )) + R− − R+ = −n ln(P), ij ij ij ij ij 
j∈Au (i ) j∈A c (i )   u 
(25) 
∑ c ( f '  − x ) + ∑  c ( f '  ) + C − − C + =  B, ij ij ij ij ij 
j∈Au (i ) j∈A c (i )   u 
(26) 
∑ t  ( f '  − x ) + ∑ t  ( f '  ) + T − − T + =  D, ij ij ij ij ij 
j∈Au (i ) j∈A c (i )   u 
(27) 
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∑ c _ attack  x + C − − C + = C , ij   ij attack attack goal 
i, j∈A 
 
 
∑ d  x + D − − D + = D , ij   ij attack attack goal 
i, j∈A 
(28) 
 
 
(29) 
  
  
∑ xi, j ≤ r, 
i, j∈A 
 
 
C +, C −, R+, R−,T +,T −, C + , C − , D+ , D− ≥ 0. 
attack attack attack attack 
 
(30) 
 
 
(31) 
 
Phase 3: SCIM-Strategy: House of Targeting 
 
It is possible to consider other goals, given the mission objectives, moreover, in 
deliberate planning, varying the goal priorities can give different target priorities.The 
House of Targeting (HOT) for Phase 3 adapts the House of Quality (HOQ) approach 
discussed in Chapter 2 to develop a target screening model. Similar to that in Table 1, 
each section of the HOT addresses different aspects of the decision making process that 
must be considered when planning a supply chain network interdiction. The HOT is 
simply another way to depict targeting doctrine and incorporate screening. Where the 
HOQ helps identify products suitable for a firm to produce, HOT helps identify targets 
that meet mission objectives given both kinetic and non-kinetic weaponeering options. 
The descriptions specific to the different sections of HOT are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. House of Targeting Description 
 
 
Section of House of Targeting Description 
 
(a) Potential Targets 
Who/what are the targets? These targets are 
determined by the SS-I and SCNF-I models in Phase 
2. 
 
(b) Goal Assessment 
Will a disruption to this target achieve our mission 
priorities? What does it do to our opponents’ 
priorities? This section annotates the deviation 
variables from SS-I and SCNF-I. 
 
(c ) Importance 
Are all targets equally important? A numerical value 
must be applied to each target to quantitatively assess 
its importance. 
 
(d) Capabilities Assessment 
What are our potential available courses of action 
(COAs)? Different strategies are developed based on 
the mission and target set, while considering the 
resources available to conduct the COAs. 
 
 
(e) Relationship Matrix 
Are the courses of action feasible for this target? A 
subjective assessment is conducted to quantify the 
feasibility and effectiveness for the relationship 
between each COA and target. An appropriate 
weighting system must be used. 
 
 
(f) Correlation Matrix 
How does one course of action affect the others? A 
correlation assessment between COAs is conducted to 
ensure they will not negatively interfere with each 
other, and may reveal that some COAs indeed 
complement each other. 
 
(g) Target Values 
Establish ideal disruption measures. Based on the 
mission objective, establish measures for each COA. 
These measures can be derived from SS-I and SCNF- 
I, or developed according to the mission. 
 
(h) Weights 
Relative weights of courses of action. Incorporates the 
importance of each target and the relationship matrix 
scores to assign a final weight to each COA. 
(i) Mission Objective 
Assessment 
A final assessment, based on the HOT holistically, 
taking into account the final weights, the goal 
assessment, and the mission objectives. 
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Based on these descriptions, a template HOT is displayed in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. Template House of Targeting 
 
The HOT, therefore, can be built by filling in the questions or description from 
Table 2 in a template HOT in Figure 9. Following are the steps to build a HOT. 
Step 0: Develop an interdiction mission and objectives. Before going through 
the steps in HOT, a planning team must define the mission and mission objectives. The 
purpose of the HOT is to develop a strategy to support the mission and its objectives, so 
without a mission, HOT is a moot point. Mission objectives should be quantifiable as 
they are utilized in the Target Values row, filled in during Step 7. Throughout the 
building of the HOT, it is important to keep the purpose of the SCIM in mind. In the 
bigger picture, the SCIM ultimately supports the phases of the Joint Targeting Process. 
Therefore, the building of the HOT should be viewed from a doctrinal lens, such as that 
found in Joint Publication 3-60 or Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-0. The target and COA 
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development should utilize an effects-based approach to operations to ensure that all 
interdiction effects can be traced back to the mission objectives. 
Step 1: Identify the targets. The Potential Targets are the outputs of the model(s) 
from Phase 2. They can be a list of suppliers identified by SS-I or a critical flow of 
material identified by SCNF-I, or a combination of the two. For example, the left column 
of HOT could be filled in as shown in Figure 9, with the top two targets from each of the 
interdiction models. 
 
 
Figure 9. Potential Target List 
 
Step 2: Rank the targets. The importance column allows the decision maker to 
rank the targets. The ranks can be a direct result of the models from Phase I. To facilitate 
a weighted sum in evaluation, an inverse ranking is suggested. For example, the target 
identified by the model chosen in Phase I with the worst objective function value can be 
ranked #1, followed by the second best target as #2, and so forth. However, the decision 
maker, analyst, and planners can adjust ranks as they see fit. Any numerically sound 
ranking method may be used; (for further discussion, the reader is referred to (Burke, 
Kloeber, and Deckro, 2003)). The scoring method, however, must be repeatable and 
theoretically sound. 
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attack attack 
As an example, the column next to the Potential Targets would be filled in as 
shown in Figure 10, with 4 being the most important target, followed by 3, 2, 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Target Ranks 
 
 
Step 3: Relate the goals to the targets. The Goal Assessment is also informed by 
Phase 2 of SCIM and takes into account the the priorities, goals, and associated deviation 
variables. Since the priorities in the models in Phase 2 are weighted in the goal 
programming models, the goal assessment gives the decision maker a visual reminder of 
which goal the target is most vulnerable to. For each target, a “+” or a “-” sign will be 
input into the Goal Assessment matrix to identify how each target relates to each priority. 
The signs in this step reflect the deviation variables from the optimal solution in the SS-I 
and SCNF-I models. For example, if the positive cost deviation variable, C + , appears in 
the solution to Target 1 from SS-I, then the corresponding box in the Goal Assessment 
would get a “+”. Alternatively, if C − appears in the solution to Target 1 from SS-I, then 
the Goal Assessment box would receive a “-”. As an example, consider if, for Target 1 
from SS-I, the variables C +, R−,T +, C + ,  and D+ are all variables in the optimal 
 
solution. If a goal is precisely met, with no overage or underage, their block will be filled 
in with a “o”. Their corresponding row in the Goal Assessment matrix, then, is shown in 
Figure 11. This allows the decision maker to incorporate the results of the models and 
goal programming priorities into their decision. 
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Figure 11. Goal Assessment 
 
 
 
Step 4: Develop courses of action (COAs) for interdiction. The Capabilities 
Assessment provides the interdiction planners to develop COAs. The courses of action 
must take into consideration the types of targets they have, the mission objective, the 
resources and capabilities available to be expended. They should also consider the 
inherent vulnerabilities within supply chains, as discussed in Chapter 2. The risks shown 
in Figure 5 are a good place to start. COAs can target any of the risks considered in 
Figure 5 by focusing on a supply chain’s human networks (such as the workforce), 
specific business organizations (such as the suppliers and manufacturers), and 
infrastructure networks (such as the physical structures where supply chain tasks occur). 
Of course, specific mission requirements and constraints would dictate the COA options. 
The vertical columns atop the HOT would then be filled in as shown in Figure 12. Note 
that each strategy in Figure 12 actually represents a tactic to be utilized in developing an 
overall interdiction strategy. Here, they are used interchangeably but we recognize the 
difference between the two. Only tactics must be determined in developing COAs. 
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Figure 12. Courses of Action 
 
Step 5: Fill in the Correlation Matrix. The Correlation Matrix, the roof of HOT, 
represents the relationship between COAs. For a decision making team, it is important to 
consider how the choice of one COA affects another, especially if multiple targets are 
going to be attacked.  A “+” denotes a positive relationship, while a “-” denotes a 
negative relationship. For example, consider the following three strategies: (1) bomb the 
target, (2) intercept raw materials to the target, and (3) introduce counterfeits into the 
target’s supply chain. Strategies (2) and (3) will have positive relationships because they 
can be performed simultaneously, whereas Strategy (1) would have a negative 
relationship with both (2) and (3). This is shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Correlation Matrix 
 
Step 6: Fill in the Relationship Matrix. 
 
The scoring of the relationship matrix is perhaps the most important step in 
building the HOT. While the methodology will vary according to the decision maker 
preferences, it is vital that a sound numerical approach is used (refer to (Burke et al., 
2003) for a discussion on scoring techniques). Similar to the discussion regarding 
consistent scoring of the damage coefficients in the interdiction models, the scoring 
methodology must be reproducible and consistent in order to be most effective. 
The scoring methodology can be both color coded and quantified. One example of 
a targeting screening matrix used by the International Warfare Planning Capability 
(Allen, 2003) is shown in Figure 14, where the matrix is color coded as well as 
numerically coded. The idea is that the relationship between a target and COA pair be 
evaluated objectively in order to properly inform an interdiction decision. 
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Figure 14. Example Screening Matrix 
 
Factors to consider during the scoring of the relationship matrix include risk 
tolerances of the decision maker and the feasibility of each COA for each target. A 
comprehensive method of determination to establish consistency and elicitation of 
bounds is necessary when scoring this matrix. The principles from Joint Publication 3-60, 
Targeting Doctrine and the updated Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-0 (2016), Operations 
and Planning are foundational to not only the scoring of this matrix but the development 
of the HOT as a whole. 
Step 7: Determine Target Values for each COA. The Target Values determine 
an ideal outcome for each COA. They are based on the mission objectives and should 
follow the effects based approach to measuring objectives. An example for the three 
COAs from Figure 13 is shown in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15. Target Values 
 
In the illustration, it is determined that in order for the “bomb the target” COA to 
succeed, 100% damage would have to be incurred. However, for the “intercept raw 
materials” COA, intercepting 50% of the materials would suffice. Lastly, if the 
“introduce counterfeits” is chosen, only an introduction of 10% counterfeits would 
effectively disrupt the target’s supply chain. 
Step 8: Determine weights for each COA. Attach weights to each COA by 
combining the Importance of each target and the Relationship Matrix. In the original 
House of Quality, often the weight of a COA is the sum product of an item’s importance 
with its corresponding COA column values. This approach can be utilized in the 
weighting of the HOT as well. Again, the weighting must be a numerically sound 
approach and must not be taken as a literal figure, but rather an aid to the decision 
maker’s final evaluation. 
Step 9: Evaluate HOT using Mission Objective Assessment. The Mission 
Objective Assessment allows the decision maker and planners to holistically consider 
HOT once all of the information is filled in. A final decision can be made after all 
considerations and comparisons between COAs have been accomplished. 
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The purpose of the incoroporation of the HOT into the SCIM methodology ties 
back to the implications of this research stated in Chapter 1. The SCIM methodology is 
designed to support the Joint Targeting Process. HOT is not designed to replace the 
process but rather to complement it, so it supports and should include all methodologies 
and frameworks established in the targeting doctrine found in Joint Publication 3-60 and 
Annex 3-0. 
Overall, HOT allows an interdiction planning team to systematically consider 
important aspects of a supply chain interdiction and synthesize a coherent strategy based 
on the targets, potential COAs, and the impact of and interaction between the target-COA 
pairs to attain mission objectives. The HOT is completely mission dependent, but it 
provides a valuable framework that can be used to structure a targeting and decision 
making process. A detailed example is demonstrated in Chapter 4. 
 
3.3 Summary 
 
In this chapter, a full supply chain interdiction methodology (SCIM) was 
developed. SCIM consists of 3 phases. Phase 1 includes goal programming linear and 
network models to build an optimal supply chain. Phase 2 builds upon the models in 
Phase 1 to include an interdiction and facilitate target identification. Phase 3 utilizes a 
House of Quality approach to develop a decision support tool that facilitates interdiction 
strategy development. Chapter 4 demonstrates each of the models in SCIM. 
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4. Analysis and Results 
 
 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
 
In this chapter, we work through all phases of SCIM and each model on an 
illustrative example, in Section 4.2. While the illustrative example is small, it can be 
tailored to any size supply chain that data avilability and modeling platform allow. 
Solution techniques used in this chapter are straightforward mixed-integer linear 
programs solvers, but with larger problems, other techniques mentioned in Chapter 2 may 
be utilized to solve large-scalee systems more efficiently. Section 4.3 summarizes key 
considerations in the application of the SCIM models, and Section 4.4 concludes the 
chapter. 
 
4.2 Illustrative Examples 
 
SCIM: SS and SS-I 
 
Consider an attacker wishing to disrupt the acquisition of a manufacturer’s UAS 
production. While the manufacturer’s suppliers are undetermined, the attacker has access 
to the following data considering the manufacturer: the UAS manufacturer is currently 
choosing suppliers for four major tasks. The tasks in this case are Level 3 tasks from 
Appendix I, or the major systems of a UAS. They must acquire an airframe among three 
suppliers, a propulsion system among two suppliers, vehicle subsystems among four 
suppliers, and an avionics package among seven suppliers. Some suppliers are able to 
perform multiple tasks, so overall there are ten suppliers available to the UAS 
manufacturer. The attacker is able to estimate their interdiction cost, as well as a damage 
coefficient, for each of the task/supplier combinations. This damage coefficient can be 
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determined using a value hierarchy, but for demonstration purposes in this illustrative 
example, the damage coefficient is assigned using a uniform 1 to 10 distribution, where 1 
is the least damage and 10 is the most damage. The data is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. SS/SS-I Illustrative Example Data 
 
 
Task Name Task # Supplie r # Re liability -ln(Re l) Cost ($Millions) Time (Weeks) Interdiction Cost ($10K) Damage 
Airframe 1 6 0.662 0.413 0.953 3 5 4 
Airframe 1 10 0.913 0.091 1.782 4 1 6 
Airframe 1 2 0.857 0.154 1.816 3 3 8 
Propulsion 2 6 0.663 0.410 1.775 7 1 9 
Propulsion 2 8 0.734 0.309 1.511 5 1 3 
Vehicle Subsystems 3 8 0.894 0.441 2.033 5 2 3 
Vehicle Subsystems 3 5 0.644 0.111 1.659 6 5 3 
Vehicle Subsystems 3 1 0.554 0.591 1.273 5 4 3 
Vehicle Subsystems 3 3 0.577 0.550 1.869 4 4 7 
Avionics 4 8 0.881 0.127 2.001 8 2 9 
Avionics 4 4 0.795 0.229 2.037 9 2 2 
Avionics 4 9 0.899 0.106 2.117 7 5 6 
Avionics 4 1 0.818 0.201 1.974 8 5 10 
Avionics 4 6 0.876 0.133 2.150 9 4 6 
Avionics 4 2 0.593 0.523 1.035 7 3 3 
Avionics 4 7 0.787 0.239 1.720 6 5 8 
 
Because the suppliers are unknown, the attacker must estimate the manufacturer’s 
selection by utilizing the Supplier Selection (SS) model  before developing the 
interdiction set. The attacker reasonably assumes that a manufacturer’s first priority (W1 ) 
is cost, followed by reliability (W2 ), followed by time (W3 ). The weights for the priorities 
in the objective function must be chosen carefully taking into account the difference in 
magnitude of the units. For this example, weights are assigned based on order of 
magnitude as follows: W1 =1,000, W2 =100, W3 =10, ε1 , ε2 and ε3 = 0.001. The attacker 
assumes the following goals for both the manufacturer in the SS model and itself in the 
SS-I model. 
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Table 4. SS and SS-I Goals 
 
 
SS OEM Goals SS-I Attacker Goals 
 
OEM Cost, B 
OEM 
Reliability, 
P 
OEM Time 
(weeks), D 
Interdiction 
Resource 
Limit, r 
Damage, Dgoal 
Interdiction 
Cost, Cgoal 
$ 5 (M) (0.80) 0.893 18 2 20 $ 100 
 
 
OEM cost and time goals are based off of a best case scenario estimation. OEM 
reliability goal was determined by using Equation (32) with n=4 tasks being the 
multiplier: 
P = −4 ln(0.80) = 0.89257 (32) 
 
This goal implies that the manufacturer overall (across all four tasks/systems) wishes to 
have a product with 80% reliability. 
The attacker’s resource limitations, interdiction cost goal, and damage goal are 
mission dependent. The attacker’s priorities are to first cause the most damage, then at 
the least cost. They have the hard constraint of no more than two interdictions. 
Based on the data in Tables 3 and 4 and the goals and priorities of the 
manufacturer and the attacker, the following models are setup for SS and SS-I: 
 OEM Supplier Selection Goal Program, SS 
Minimize 1000C + +100R+ +10T + − 0.001C − − 0.001R− − 0.001T − 
Subject to ∑ yis ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ I , 
s∈S (i )   
 
∑ ∑ c y  + C − − C + = 5, is    is 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
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∑ ∑ y  (−ln(r )) + R− − R+ = 0.89257, is is 
i∈I  s∈S (i )   
∑ ∑ t  y + T − − T + = 18, is   is 
i∈I  s∈S (i )   
C +, C −, R+, R−,T +,T − ≥ 0 ; y  ∈{0,1} . 
is 
 
This model was coded into GAMS and solved as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) 
invoking CPLEX. The code template for SS is shown in Appendix B, where the user can 
fill in with the appropriate data. This model contains 22 variables (16 supplier selection 
variables and 6 deviation variables), and 8 equations. The execution time utilizing the 
NEOS Server was 0.002 seconds. 
The GAMS solution to this model is depicted in Table 5 and shows that the 
 
optimal solution occurs when  y*  = y*  = y*  =  y* = 1 and the rest of the y’s are zero. 
16 28 31 42 
 
This indicates that, according to the manufacturer’s priorities, they will choose Supplier 6 
for Task 1 (Airframe), Supplier 8 for Task 2 (Propulsion), Supplier 1 for Task 3 (Vehicle 
Subsystems), and Supplier 2 for Task 4 (Avionics). 
Table 5. Manufacturer’s Supplier Selection 
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As shown in Table 6 for the deviation variables, this results in a budget underage 
of $0.228M, or $228,000, a reliability overage of 0.943, and a time overage of two 
weeks. Note the reliability overage is actually considered a shortage due to the 
transformation discussed in setting up Equation (3) in SS development. These results 
suggest that the manufacturer was only able to meet, and in fact exceed, its first priority 
of cost. For their given budget/cost priority, the best they can do in terms of reliability is 
0.943 (where optimal would be zero). Reliabilities are normally measured on a zero to 
one scale, but due to the linear transformation utilized in Equation (3) this value can 
exceed 1 because it is an additive value. To interpret these values, rather than evaluate the 
value itself, the magnitude of the deviation variable can be used as a proxy. If the actual 
reliability was desired, the analyst would have to go back to the data and calculate its 
value. However, for the purposes of goal attainment, suffice it to say that the 
manufacturer has not met its goal. Finally, given this supplier selection set, the 
manufacturer will be two weeks behind their desired due date. 
Table 6. SS Deviation Variable Values 
 
 
Deviation 
Variable Value 
C − 0.228 
R+ 0.943 
T + 2 
 
 
Given this set of optimal suppliers to the manufacturer, the attacker’s problem is 
then modeled by SS-I according to the data in Tables 3, 4 and 5 as well as their desired 
priorities. Again, the weights are assigned based on order of magnitude; here the 
interdictor gives equal preference to desired cost and damage levels. 
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Their SS-I model is formulated as follows: 
 
 Attacker’s Supplier Selection Interdiction Goal Program, SS-I 
Minimize 10000D − +10000C + − D − − C − +1000C + +100R+ +10T + 
attack attack attack attack 
Subject to ∑ y'  ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ I , is 
s∈S (i )   
 
∑  y'  ≤ ∑ x  , ∀i ∈ I , is is 
s∈S  c (i ) s∈Su (i )   u 
 
x  ≤ y ' , ∀i ∈ I , s ∈ S, 
is is 
 
∑ ( y '  − x ) ≥ 1,  ∀i ∈ I , is is 
s∈S (i )   
 
∑ ∑ c  ( y'  − x  ) +∑ ∑ c  ( y  ) + C − − C +   =5, is is is is is 
i∈I   s∈Su (i ) i∈I   s∈Suc (i )   
 
∑ ∑ ( y'  − x  )(− ln(r )) +∑ ∑ ( y' )(− ln(r )) + R− − R+ =  −4 ln(0.80), is is is is is 
i∈I   s∈Su (i ) i∈I  s∈Suc (i )   
 
∑ ∑ t  ( y'  − x ) +∑ ∑ t  ( y' ) + T − − T + = 18, is is is is is 
i∈I   s∈Su (i ) i∈I  s∈Suc (i )   
 
∑ ∑ c _ attack  x + C − − C + = 10, is   is attack attack 
i∈I   s∈S (i )   
 
∑ ∑ d  x  + D − − D + = 20, is   is attack attack 
i∈I  s∈S (i )   
 
yis ∈{0,1} , xis ∈{0,1} ∀i ∈ I , s ∈ S (i), 
C +, C −, R+, R−,T +,T −, D+ , D− , C + , C − ≥ 0 . 
attack attack attack attack 
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where for the set s ∈ S (i) ,  y*   = y*    = y*   = y* = 1  and are therefore the 
u 16 28 35 42 
 
interdictable suppliers. Once again, the SS-I model was coded into GAMS and solved as 
a MILP (also shown in Appendix B). In SS-I, there are two sets of decision variables: the 
attacker’s interdiction set, and the manufacturer’s new decision based on the interdiction. 
Tables 7 and 8 show the GAMS output for these decision variables, respectively. In total, 
there are 42 variables (10 deviation variables, 16 supplier selection variables, and 16 
interdiction variables) and 34 constraints. Execution time for SS-I in the NEOS Server is 
0.001 seconds. 
 
Table 7. Attacker’s Interdiction Set 
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31 42 
Table 8. Manufacturer’s New Supplier Selection 
 
 
 
From Table 7, the attacker’s optimal interdiction target set is  x*   = x* = 1 which 
16 28 
 
suggests the manufacturer will choose new suppliers for Tasks 1 and 2 (Airframe and 
Propulsion, respectively). Their optimal replacement choices for these tasks, from Table 
8, are  y*    = y* = 1 while their original suppliers for Tasks 2 and 4 remain the same 
1,10 26 
 
( y* = y* = 1). Therefore, the model suggests that if Supplier 6 is interdicted for Task 1 
and Supplier 8 is interdicted for Task 2, given the knowledge of the manufacturers 
preferences, they are most apt to switch to Suppliers 10 and 6 for Tasks 1 and 2, 
respectively. 
 
The new deviations variables are shown in Table 8, and denote the new 
under/over-achievements of the manufacturer and the effectiveness of the attacker’s 
goals. 
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Table 9. SS-I Deviation Variable Values 
 
 
Deviation 
Variable Value 
C + 0.865 
R+ 0.722 
T + 5 
C − attack 4 
D− attack 13 
 
 
The interdiction of Suppliers 6 and 5 for Tasks 1 and 3 and replacement by 
Suppliers 10 and 1 increases the manufacturer’s cost by $0.637M ($637,000) (i.e. ∆C + 
=0.865-0.228), and reliability decreases by 0.221 ( ∆R+ =0.943-0.722) (remember this is 
 
actually a increase in reliability due to the transformation, so it is less than ideal for the 
attacker), but the time is delayed by another three weeks ( ∆T + =5-2). The attacker is able 
to stay under budget by $4 and is under its damage goal of 20 by 13 points, but based on 
the possible supplier set given, the damage is maximized. 
SCIM: SCNF and SCNF-I 
 
One way to utilize SCNF and SCNF-I in conjunction with SS-I is to model the 
flow of the materials (or systems, components, suppliers, and so forth) for the supplier 
identified as vulnerable in SS-I. In SS-I, two systems’ suppliers were identified as 
vulnerable, one for the Airframe and the other for the Propulsion. Suppose the supply 
chain network flow of materials in order to produce an Airframe appears as shown in 
Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. Illustrative Supply Chain Network Flow 
 
The supply chain consists of Nodes 2 to 13. Node 1 is introduced as a super node 
with artificially large supply that facilitates the network flow formulation. For this reason, 
the arcs flowing out of the super node are dashed to denote that material is not actually 
flowing through these arcs, but rather it embodies the decision to choose one of the nodes 
to which it enters (i.e., 2, 3, 4, or 5). The loss across these arcs is therefore 1 because no 
loss is incrued. However, the loss of 0.25 on the remaining arcs represents the assembling 
of materials into parts from each node to the next. A loss of 0.25 means that four parts 
from a previous node is required to make one part at the current node. The Airframe 
manufacturer, represented by Node 13, must meet a demand of five airframes. The data 
for a manufacturer and attacker is shown in Table 10 with associated goals in Table 11. 
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Table 10. SCNF/SCNF-I Data 
 
 
Node i Node j Costij Re lij Time ij Lossij Uij AttackCostij Destructij Bi 
1 2 0 0.010 0 1 320 10000 0 1E+12 
1 3 0 0.010 0 1 320 10000 0 0 
1 4 0 0.010 0 1 320 10000 0 0 
1 5 0 0.010 0 1 320 10000 0 0 
2 6 19.11 0.846 4 0.25 320 89.93 7 0 
2 8 26.05 0.071 3 0.25 320 102.9 10 0 
3 6 26.85 1.100 3 0.25 320 172.2 9 0 
3 7 31.41 0.111 5 0.25 320 145.3 6 0 
4 7 23.98 0.155 2 0.25 320 124.5 8 0 
4 8 28.95 0.801 3 0.25 320 112.8 9 0 
4 9 20.5 1.059 3 0.25 320 91.51 3 0 
5 8 20.75 0.918 3 0.25 320 111.7 5 0 
5 9 23.85 0.869 3 0.25 320 102.9 2 -5 
6 10 51.73 1.079 2 0.25 80 118.5 9  
7 10 51.2 0.328 2 0.25 80 120.2 6  
8 11 59.8 1.296 5 0.25 80 188.9 9  
8 12 40.8 0.293 3 0.25 80 60.37 9  
9 12 54.33 1.282 1 0.25 80 114 3  
10 13 101.79 1.160 2 0.25 20 102.7 5  
11 13 123.17 3.126 1 0.25 20 143.5 8  
12 13 112.25 0.251 1 0.25 20 124 6  
 
 
 
Table 11. SCNF and SCNF-I Goals 
 
 
SCNF Manufacturer Goals SCNF-I Attacker Goals 
 
OEM Cost, B Reliability, P 
OEM Time 
(days), D 
Interdiction 
Resource 
Limit, r 
Damage, Dgoal 
Interdiction 
Cost, Cgoal 
$13,000 (0.80) 112 1095 50 500 $5,000 
 
 
The manufacturer’s cost is based off of historical data—they estimate that each 
Airframe costs $2.6M. The time is also based off of recent contracts and they estimate a 
total time frame of 3 years to develop these airframes. Finally, their reliability goal is 
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determined using equation (32), with an estimation of 500 components necessary to build 
the airframe each with a reliability goal of 80% 
P = −500 ln(0.80) = 112 (32) 
 
Given this data, the Airframe manufacturer wishes to determine the optimal flow 
of materials in order to reach their demand. If their priorities are again cost, reliability, 
and time in that order, with an illustrative order of magnitude weighting system of W1 
=1,000, W2 =10, W3 =1, ε1 -10, ε2 =-1, and ε3 = 0.001, the manufacturer’s SCNF is shown: 
 
 Supply Chain Network Flow Goal Program 
Minimize 1000C + +10R+ + T + −10C − − R− − 0.1T − 
Subject to ∑ fij −  ∑ l ji f ji ≤ bi ,  ∀i ∈ N , 
{ j:(i, j )∈A} { j:( j ,i )∈A} 
 
0 ≤  fij ≤ uij , ∀(i, j) ∈ A, 
 
∑ c  f  + C − − C + = 13000, ij    ij 
i, j∈A 
 
∑ f  (−ln(r )) + R− − R+ =112, ij ij 
i, j∈A 
 
∑ t  f  + T − − T + = 1095, ij    ij 
i, j∈A 
 
C +, C −, R+, R−,T +,T − ≥ 0. 
 
The SCNF model was coded into GAMS (see Appendix C) and solved invoking CPLEX 
using integer linear programming. The model consists of 28 variables (1 objective 
function variable, 21 flow variables, and 6 deviation variables) and 37 constraints. The 
total run execution time was 0.002 seconds. A visual of the optimal flow of materials is 
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shown in Figure 17. In order to meet demand of 5 airframe, the manufacturer must utilize 
four suppliers in total (2, 5, 8, and 12). 
 
 
Figure 17. Optimal SCNF 
 
As shown in Table 12, the manufacturer can be under budget by $531 (or 
 
$513,000 in correct units). With this budget, however, they will be over their reliability 
goal by 213.505 (but this is actually under its goal due to the transformation). Given that 
time is their last priority, the manufacturer will be behind its due date by 125 days. They 
can achieve this by purchasing 320 units of raw material from Supplier 5. These 320 units 
are sent to Supplier 8 and assembled into 80 parts (320*0.25). Supplier 8 sends these 80 
parts to Supplier 12, who assembles them into 20 parts (80*0.25), and finally sends them 
to the manufacturer to assemble the products into 5 airframes (20*0.25). 
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Table 12. SCNF Deviation Variable Values 
 
 
Deviation 
Variable Value 
C − 531 
R+ 213.505 
T + 125 
 
 
Now that the attacker has determined what a manufacturer’s network flow looks 
like, the can utilize the SCNF-I to determine an optimal interdiction. Their goals and 
constraints are shown in Table 11. Assuming the attacker also uses a order of 
magnitutude weighting, their SCNF-I model appears as follows: 
 Supply Chain Network Flow-Interdiction Goal Program 
Minimize 10000C + +10000D− −10C − −10D+  +1000C + +10R+ + T + 
attack attack attack goal 
Subject to 
 
∑ ( f '  − x  ) −  ∑ l  ( f '   − x  ) +  ∑ ( f '  ) −  ∑ l  ( f '  ) ≤ b , ∀i ∈ N , ij ij ji ji ji ij ji ji i 
j:(i, j )∈Au j:( j ,i )∈Au j:(i, j )∈A c j:( j ,i )∈A c u  u 
0 ≤ x  ≤  f '   ≤ u , ∀(i, j) ∈ A, 
ij ij ij 
∑ ( f '  − x  )(− ln(r )) + ∑  ( f '  )(− ln(r )) + R− − R+ = 112, ij ij ij ij ij 
j∈Au (i ) j∈A c (i )   u 
∑ c ( f '  − x ) + ∑  c ( f '  ) + C − − C + = 13000, ij ij ij ij ij 
j∈Au (i ) j∈A c (i )   u 
∑ t  ( f '  − x ) + ∑ t  ( f '  ) + T − − T + = 1095, ij ij ij ij ij 
j∈Au (i ) j∈A c (i )   u 
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∑  f '  x  + C − − C + = 5000, ij   ij attack attack 
(i, j )∈A 
∑ d  x  + D − − D + = 500, ij   ij attack attack 
(i, j )∈A 
∑ xij ≤ 50, 
(i, j )∈A 
C +, C −, R+, R−,T +,T −, C + , C − , D+ , D− ≥ 0. 
attack attack attack attack 
 
This SCNF-I was likewise coded to generate the model and solved by GAMS invoking 
CPLEX (also in Appendix III). SCNF-I has a total of 53 variables (1 objective function 
variable, 21 flow variables, 21 interdiction variables, and 10 deviation variables) and 61 
constraints. The total execution time was 0.001 seconds. 
With the resources to interdict 50 units of flow, the optimal interdiction is shown 
in Figure 18 with the residual network from SCNF. The attacker’s optimal interdiction 
occurs by interdicting 50 units of subcomponents over arc (8,12), shown in red in Figure 
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18. This interdiction causes the creation of two whole new paths in order for demand to 
be met, shown by the green arcs in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18. Optimal SCNF-I 
 
Therefore, by interdicting 50 units from arc (8,12), the attacker has now forced 
the manufacturer to seek other suppliers. Rather than only utilizing three suppliers (5, 8, 
and 12), the manufacturer must also utilize suppliers 2, 4, 6, 7, and 10 to meet demand, 
because their original flow across suppliers 5, 8, and 12 has been decreased due to 
interdiction. This interdiction results in Table 13 show the deviation variables in the 
SCNF-I model. 
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Table 13. SCNF-I Deviation Variable Values 
 
 
Deviation 
Variable Value 
C + 1.41 
R+ 169.496 
T + 110 
C − attack 1981.5 
D− attack 50 
 
 
The interdictor has significantly affected the manufacturer’s cost. Whereas 
originally they were under budget, because they had to include more suppliers than 
originally intended, they are now forced to execute over their budget. Their reliability has 
improved, but they are still nowhere near their goal. While their time has improved by 15 
days, they are still behind schedule, and an improvement in time is not given high priority 
assuming it is still their last priority, so the attacker is willing to accept this. The attacker 
can achieve this interdiction under their budget, and just short of their damage goal as 
well. In fact, given their target options and resource restrictions, they have achieved 
optimal interdiction (referring to Table 10, arc (8,12) scores a “9” in damage—which is 
the highest value given the original SCNF selection by the manufacturer). 
While the values given by the deviation variables in the interdiction models 
provide insight into a theoretical interdiction on the supply chain of interest, the real 
value of the interdiction models lies in the target identification they provide. These 
targets can then be utilized by an attacker in order to strategize how to carry out an 
interdiction. 
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SCIM: HOT 
 
Based upon the targets identified in the two interdiction models, a notional HOT 
is developed. 
Step 0. The attacker commander defines the mission as follows: the attacker 
wishes to immediately prevent or delay superior UAS technology from reaching an 
enemy who is known to be seeking a specific UAS system. Because the enemy resides in 
a highly politicized area, rules of engagement (ROEs) state that civilian casualties be 
minimized as well as collateral damage. The HOT is shown in Figure 19 and discussed 
thereafter. 
 
 
Figure 19. HOT Illustrative Example 
 
Step 1. The targets in the left column denote the targets that were directly 
identified by the interdiction models, SS-I and SCNF-I in the previous phase. 
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Step 2. The target from SCNF-I is deemed most important and given an inverse 
ranking of 3, followed by the two targets identified by SS-I ranked 2 and 1. The SCNF-I 
target is given a higher ranking due to its over-achievement of the damage (destruction) 
goal. 
Step 3. The Goal Assessment matrix is filled in with the associated deviation 
variables. The signs are taken directly from Tables 9 and 13. For all targets, 
C +, R+, and T + ≥ 0 causing an overage in budget, schedule, and reliability (keep in mind 
that, due to the transformation of reliability, an overage is actually interpreted as a 
detriment rather than a good quality). For all of the targets, in both in SS-I and SCNF-I, 
the attacker  is under both their interdiction budget and their damage goal. 
Step 4. The COAs developed are shown in the top columns of the HOT. The 
COAs were developed according to the notional mission objective, in conjunction with 
considerations to the common supply chain risks developed in Figure 5 as well as 
deliberation considering effects based operations and the Joint Targeting Doctrine. 
Step 5. The correlation matrix has four “+” signs, symbolizing the positive 
relationship between the following COA pairs: transportation interdiction with raw 
materials interdiction, transportation interdiction with inject counterfeits into SC, inject 
counterfeits into SC with raw materials interdiction, and infrastructure—oil/gas with raw 
materials interdiction. The positive relationship among these pairs implies that, if 
possible, performing these COAs in conjunction could be mutually beneficial and achieve 
the effects stated by the mission more effectively than if performed separately. 
Step 6. The relationship matrix is filled with their colors based on their perceived 
feasibility and effectiveness. The Infrastructure—Facilities COA is filled in as red 
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because the ROEs specifically prohibit collateral damage and the targets are all in highly 
congested areas of civilians and other restricted targets. The COAs filled in completely as 
yellow are Workforce information operations (IO) attack, financial market attack, 
economic sanctions, and governmental policies. This is due to the fact that such attacks 
would take a long time to plan and put into effect and does not support the mission of 
immediate prevention. The COAs deemed desirable in supporting the mission and 
feasible are Transportation Interdiction, Communications Attack, Inject Counterfeits in 
the SC, Infrastructure—Oil/Gas, and Raw Materials Interdiction. They are given a green 
assignment, but also a score. A score of “1” denotes an interdiction with a longer time- 
frame to implement and subsequently reap the benefits of the effects, while a score of “2” 
denotes an interdiction that can be carried out and cause effects immediately. As shown, a 
communications attack and injecting counterfeits into SC score a “1” while transportation 
interdiction, infrastructure—oil/gas, and raw materials interdiction score a “2” based on 
the timing of their implementation and effects. 
Step 7. Targets are developed only for those COAs deemed desirable in step 6. 
 
The target analysis determined that a transportation interdiction, or likewise a 
interception of raw materials, of only 10% of materials would result in the desired 
objectives, while a communications attack on 50% of the communications network, 50% 
injection of counterfeits, or interception of 50%, or a destruction of 25% of the 
infrastructure for oil/gas would achieve the same success. 
Step 8. A weighted sum of the targets’ ranks and its relationship score is used to 
determine the COA weights (again, using weights developed in an appropriate fasion). 
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For example, the COA weight for Transportation Interdiction is 1*2+2*2+3*2=12. The 
rest of the weights are determined accordingly. 
Step 9. The HOT is now completely built. The COAs with the largest weights are 
Transportation Interdiction, Infrastructure—Oil/Gas, and Intercept Raw Materials. 
Because the SCNF-I target is ranked as most important and has the best goal assessment, 
the first recommended COA is to conduct a Transportation Interdiction on the target 
identified in SCNF-I. This is denoted by a “1” in the Capabilities Assessment row in the 
bottom of HOT. Because the COA Intercepting Raw Materials is also a complementary 
COA to Transportation Interdiction, that is recommended as a second option, or possibly 
an augmentation. Of course, the final decision will be made after an equity review at the 
discretion of the commander. 
 
4.3 Key Considerations 
 
This illustrative example effectively demonstrates the process of the SCIM phases 
and how the models work, and how they are all tied together. Because it is a notional 
example and based on synthetic data, and based on the nature of the models themselves, 
there are some key considerations to point out. 
While the models are setup as goal programs, this feature is not required. All of 
the goal constraints might have been expressed as hard constraints (with strict 
inequalities); the models are flexible enough to handle such considerations. If goal 
programming is to be used, the determination of the goals and their aspiration levels is an 
important factor in the effectiveness of the models. Goals can be based on historical data, 
94  
best or worst case scenarios, or other methods of estimation that lend themselves to the 
problem. 
Goal programs are suited for multiple objectives, but this is also not a requirement 
and the models are still valid with single objective functions. However, if goal 
programming is utilized, the determination of the weights is another important factor. 
Whether they are preemptive or numerical, it is important that they accurately reflect the 
decision maker’s priorities and are developed using a consistent numerical method. 
While in the examples and formulations we used cost, reliability, and time for the 
manufacturer’s priorities and cost and damage for the attacker’s, the definition of the 
priorities are completely decision maker dependent and also rely upon the availability of 
data. The models are not limited to these attributes, but rather can be tailored to the 
supply chain at hand. 
Lastly, although this research focused on UAS supply chains, the models 
developed are applicable to any supply chain and provide flexibility to model any level of 
fidelity that the data can support. 
 
4.4 Summary 
 
The phases of SCIM offer decision making support in the targeting development 
phase of the Joint Targeting Process. The first phase of SCIM allows an attacker to frame 
or estimate their enemies’ supply chain design. If the design is already known, the 
attacker can begin the SCIM process with the second phase. The flexibility of the goal 
programming interdiction models provide the decision maker the ability to explore 
different views of the supply chain, whether it be from a supplier selection or network 
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flow perspective, and determine optimal interdiction targets. The last phase of SCIM ties 
together the targets identified by the models with targeting doctrine. This allows decision 
makers to incorporate what they already know—doctrine—with the insights provided by 
the models. 
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter provides the research conclusions derived from developing the 
supply chain interdiction methodology. Section 5.2 provides a summary of the research 
questions. Section 5.3 discusses the significance of the models developed and their 
applicability to operational supply chain design and interdiction. Finally, Section 5.4 
suggests possible areas of future research to expand upon the models developed in this 
study. 
 
5.2 Conclusions of Research 
 
This study developed a supply chain interdiction methodology (SCIM) consisting 
of three phases. Each phase of SCIM was designed to answer the research questions 
posed in Chapter 1. 
Research Questions Answered 
 
1. How can an analyst model optimal UAS supply chain design? 
 
Important decisions during the design of a supply chain include which suppliers to 
choose and how to integrate the flow of materials between all suppliers in order to 
make a product. These decisions are be modeled utilizing goal programming to reflect 
a decision maker’s priorities. Specifically, the supplier selection decision is be 
modeled as a simple assignment problem, matching suppliers to tasks, with the 
incorporation of goals that must set by the manufacturing decision maker. Likewise, 
the flow of materials is be modeled as a classic network flow model with the 
incorporation of the goals set by the manufacturing decision maker. 
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2. How can an analyst model the best UAS supply chain interdiction? 
 
Models intended to interdict a supply chain expand upon supply chain design 
models. This occurs by taking the optimal design models and introducing new 
decision variables and goals to represent the attacker’s perspective. The attacker’s 
objective is given more priority, but the manufacturer’s objective is still included so 
that the model not only defines optimal interdiction but suggests how the 
manufacturer may act to overcome the interdiction. 
3. How can a decision maker strategize UAS supply chain interdiction? 
 
Building on the House of Quality, a targeting screening matrix that incorporates 
all of the insights provided by the interdiction models with targeting doctrine is 
developed to provide a decision making framework with which to utilize the models 
and develop an interdiction plan and assessment. 
 
5.3 Significance of Research 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a large amount of research in the area of goal 
programming applied to supplier selection and generalized network flow models. There is 
also a vast amount of network interdiction models. As far as we can tell, this study is the 
first attempt to incorporate all of these concepts and integrate goal programming 
techniques with supply chain interdiction. 
The flexibility of the models provide the decision maker with a vast amount of 
options in their employment of the methodology. The suite of models provides the supply 
chain designer or interdictor the ability to consider vital supply chain decisions from two 
points of view: supplier selection and flow of materials. The models are expandable and 
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can represent any level of hierarchy and fidelity of the supply chain to include any tier of 
suppliers or level of tasks. For example, the models can be applied on a macroscopic 
level to consider only prominent suppliers or large systems, or they can be applied on a 
microscopic level and hone in on a particular system’s supply chain of components and 
materials. This idea was demonstrated in the illustrative example wherein SS-I was 
utilized to view the supply chain from a macroscopic level to identify vulnerable Level 3 
tasks suppliers, and SCNF-I was used on a microscopic level to model the supply chain 
interdiction of the specific suppliers network flow identified by SS-I. 
For an interdictor employing the models, the supply chain network flow 
interdiction model supports a commander’s deliberate planning for interdiction and 
allows the opportunity to build and investigate different target cut sets and cut set trees. 
Flexibility is also inherent in the goal programming nature of the models. 
 
Decision makers are free to define and prioritize any set of goals. Sensitivity analysis on 
these priorities will provide even greater insight to the attainment of their goals. 
 
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
Because this research is a new application of goal programming and supply chain 
network interdiction, there are many areas to consider for future research. One area 
particular area of interest for the interdiction component is to expand upon supply chain 
network flow model and transform the conservation of flow constraint for the demand 
node into a goal constraint. This would allow an interdictor to identify how much 
material they must interdict in order to cause a certain desired effect on the 
manufacturer’s demand. 
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Another suggested approach is to explore all of the models’ applicability to 
supply chains with real, rather than notional, data. This can be accomplished via case 
studies, particularly for the supply chain design models (SS and SCNF). The application 
of SS and SCNF can be compared with other supply chain models, like those discussed in 
Section 2.6, to validate the approach. 
Finally, a robust sensitivity analysis on the manufacturer’s and attacker’s 
priorities, weights, and aspiration levels in all models is an area of research that would 
provide great insight to those wishing to utilize the interdiction models. As discussed in 
Section 4.3, the setting of these values is key in determining an optimal solution. If 
misspecified or misunderstood, the solution can lead to an outcome that was not 
originally intended. A study that delved into the interactions between priorities, weights, 
and aspiration levels would facilitate a greater understanding of the models and lead to 
better use of them. 
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Appendix A: Excerpt from MIL-STD-881C 
Table 14. Work Breakdown Structure for UAV Systems 
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Appendix B: GAMS Code for Supplier Selection and Supplier Selection- 
Interdiction Models 
 
$inlinecom /* */ 
*offdigit 
*$offsymxref offsymlist 
 
* option 
* solprint = off, 
* sysout = off; 
 
*SUPPLIER SELECTION 
 
Set 
i   tasks/ INSERT DATA / ; 
*alias(i,j) 
 
Set 
j possible_suppliers/ INSERT DATA /; 
 
Set 
suppliers(i,j) task_suppliers / INSERT DATA /; 
 
Parameters 
cost(i,j) cost to supply task(i) from supplier(j) / INSERT DATA /, 
time(i,j) lead time to supply task(i) from supplier(j) / INSERT DATA /, 
reliability(i,j) reliability to supply task(i) from supplier(j) / INSERT DATA /, 
interdiction_cost(i,j) cost to interdict task(i) from supplier(j) / INSERT DATA /, 
damage(i,j) damage to disrupt supply task(i) from supplier(j) / INSERT DATA /; 
Scalars 
CostGoal Manufacturers budget goal 
ReliabilityGoal  Manufacturers quality goal 
TimeGoal Manufacturers time goal 
Variables 
z objective function; 
Binary Variables 
y(i,j) supplier choice; 
Positive Variables 
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Cplus   "Over Deviation of Cost Goal" 
Cminus "Under Deviation of Cost Goal" 
Rplus   "Over Deviation of Reliability Goal" 
Rminus "Under Deviation of Reliability Goal" 
Tplus   "Over Deviation of Time Goal" 
Tminus "Under Deviation of Time Goal"; 
 
CostGoal = INSERT DATA 
ReliabilityGoal = INSERT DATA 
TimeGoal = INSERT DATA 
 
Equations 
Obj first priority objective function 
ChooseOne(i) Choose one supplier 
Budget  Budget or Cost goal 
ReliabilityG  Rel goal 
TaskLT Time Goal; 
 
Obj.. z=e= INSERT DATA ; 
ChooseOne(i).. sum(j,y(i,j)$suppliers(i,j))=e=1; 
Budget.. sum(suppliers(i,j),cost(i,j)*y(i,j))+CMinus-Cplus=e=CostGoal; 
ReliabilityG..  sum(suppliers(i,j),reliability(i,j)*y(i,j))+RMinus- 
Rplus=e=ReliabilityGoal; 
TaskLT.. sum(suppliers(i,j),time(i,j)*y(i,j))+Tminus-Tplus=e=TimeGoal; 
Model SS / Obj, ChooseOne, budget, ReliabilityG, TaskLT /; 
Solve SS using mip minimizing z ; 
 
************************************************************************ 
******* 
************************************************************************ 
******* 
************************************************************************ 
******* 
 
*SUPPLIER SELECTION-INTERDICTION 
 
Variables 
zz objective function; 
Positive Variables 
Cattackplus "Over Deviation of Interdiction Cost Goal" 
Cattackminus "Under Deviation of Interdiction Cost Goal" 
Dattackplus "Over Deviation of Damage Goal" 
Dattackminus "Under Deviation of Damage Goal"; 
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Binary Variables 
x(i,j) interdiction choice 
ynew(i,j) mfg new choice; 
Parameters 
Iu(i,j)  indicator for u current supplieri for taskj (ij) 
Cgoal interdiction goal 
Dgoal destruction interdiction goal; 
 
Scalar 
r   Number disruptions allowed; 
 
*Parameter definition 
r = INSERT DATA 
Iu(i,j) = y.l(i,j); 
Cgoal = INSERT DATA 
Dgoal = INSERT DATA 
 
Equations 
Obj2 objective function 
ChooseOne2(i)  Choose one supplier 
ChooserInt(i) Proxy suppliers 
IfThen(i)  If interdicted mfg chooses another 
XltY(i,j) X must be less than Y 
Disrupt choose r suppliers to target 
Budget2 Budget or Cost goal 
Reliability2Rel goal 
TaskLT2   Time Goal 
InterdictionCost Cost to Interdict 
DamageGoal Interdiciton damage goal; 
 
Obj2.. zz=e= INSERT DATA; 
ChooseOne2(i).. sum(j,ynew(i,j)$suppliers(i,j))=g=1; 
ChooserInt(i)..  sum(j,ynew(i,j)$suppliers(i,j)-x(i,j)$suppliers(i,j))=g=1; 
IfThen(i).. sum(j,(1- 
Iu(i,j))*ynew(i,j)$suppliers(i,j))=l=sum(j,(Iu(i,j)*x(i,j)$suppliers(i,j))); 
XltY(i,j)..  x(i,j)$suppliers(i,j)=l=ynew(i,j)$suppliers(i,j); 
Disrupt.. sum(suppliers(i,j),Iu(i,j)*x(i,j))=l=r; 
Budget2.. sum(suppliers(i,j),cost(i,j)*((Iu(i,j)*(ynew(i,j)-x(i,j)))+(1- 
Iu(i,j))*ynew(i,j)))+CMinus-Cplus=e=CostGoal; 
Reliability2.. sum(suppliers(i,j),reliability(i,j)*((Iu(i,j)*(ynew(i,j)- 
x(i,j)))+(1-Iu(i,j))*ynew(i,j)))+RMinus-Rplus=e=ReliabilityGoal; 
TaskLT2.. sum(suppliers(i,j),time(i,j)*((Iu(i,j)*(ynew(i,j)-x(i,j)))+(1- 
Iu(i,j))*ynew(i,j)))+TMinus-Tplus=e=TimeGoal; 
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InterdictionCost.. 
sum(suppliers(i,j),interdiction_cost(i,j)*x(i,j)$suppliers(i,j))+Cattackminus- 
Cattackplus=e=Cgoal; 
DamageGoal.. 
sum(suppliers(i,j),damage(i,j)*x(i,j)$suppliers(i,j))+Dattackminus-Dattackplus=e=Dgoal; 
 
 
Model SSI / Obj2,ChooseOne2, ChooserInt, IfThen, XltY, Disrupt, Budget2, 
Reliability2, TaskLT2, InterdictionCost, DamageGoal /; 
 
Solve SSI using mip minimizing zz ; 
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Appendix C: GAMS Code for Supply Chain and Supply Chain Network 
Flow-Interdiction Models 
 
 
 
$inlinecom /* */ 
*offdigit 
*$offsymxref offsymlist 
 
* option 
* solprint = off, 
* sysout = off; 
 
 
Set 
i nodes/ INSERT DATA HERE / ; 
alias(i,j); 
Set 
arcs(i,j)   network_arcs  / INSERT DATA HERE /; 
 
Parameters 
cost(i,j)  cost to supplier / INSERT DATA HERE /, 
reliability(i,j) reliability of transportation for (i) from (j) / INSERT DATA HERE /, 
time(i,j) lead time to supply (i) to (j) / INSERT DATA HERE /, 
interdiction_cost(i,j) cost to interdict (i) to (j) / INSERT DATA HERE  /, 
damage(i,j) damage to disrupt  (i) to (j) / INSERT DATA HERE /, 
loss(i,j) loss from  (i) to (j) / INSERT DATA HERE  /, 
u(i,j) upper limit from (i) to (j) / INSERT DATA HERE /, 
b(i) demand at node i / INSERT DATA HERE /; 
 
Scalars 
CostGoal Manufacturers budget goal 
ReliabilityGoal  Manufacturers quality goal 
TimeGoal Manufacturers time goal; 
 
CostGoal =  INSERT DATA HERE ; 
ReliabilityGoal = INSERT DATA HERE ; 
TimeGoal =  INSERT DATA HERE ; 
 
Variables 
z objective function; 
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Positive Variables 
flow(i,j) flow per arc 
Cplus   "Over Deviation of Cost Goal" 
Cminus "Under Deviation of Cost Goal" 
Rplus   "Over Deviation of Reliability Goal" 
Rminus "Under Deviation of Reliability Goal" 
Tplus   "Over Deviation of Time Goal" 
Tminus "Under Deviation of Time Goal";; 
Equations 
Obj objective function 
ConsOfFlow(i) conservation of flow 
Budget Budget or Cost goal 
ReliabilityG  Rel goal 
TaskLT Time Goal 
FlowLimit(i,j) Upper bound on flow; 
 
Obj.. z=e= INSERT DATA HERE ; 
ConsOfFlow(i).. sum(j,flow(i,j)$arcs(i,j))- 
sum(j,loss(j,i)$arcs(j,i)*flow(j,i)$arcs(j,i))=l=b(i); 
Budget.. sum(arcs(i,j),cost(i,j)*flow(i,j))+CMinus-Cplus=e=CostGoal; 
ReliabilityG..  sum(arcs(i,j),reliability(i,j)*flow(i,j))+RMinus- 
Rplus=e=ReliabilityGoal; 
TaskLT.. sum(arcs(i,j),time(i,j)*flow(i,j))+Tminus-Tplus=e=TimeGoal; 
FlowLimit(i,j)..  flow(i,j)$arcs(i,j)=l=u(i,j)$arcs(i,j); 
 
Model SCNF / Obj, ConsOfFlow, Budget, ReliabilityG, TaskLT, FlowLimit /; 
Solve SCNF using mip minimizing z ; 
************************************************************************ 
******* 
************************************************************************ 
******* 
************************************************************************ 
*******THIS MODEL IS AN INDICATOR MODEL TO IDENTIFY CURRENT 
FLOW PATH 
Variables 
zz objective function; 
 
 
Binary Variables 
108  
Iu(i,j)   binary proxy for current flow; 
 
 
Positive Variables 
Holder(i,j); 
 
Scalar 
BigM  big M; 
 
*Scalar Definition 
BigM = 1000000; 
Parameters 
current(i,j); 
 
*Parameter Definition 
current(i,j)=flow.l(i,j); 
 
Equations 
ObjI 
IfThen2; 
 
ObjI.. zz=e=sum(arcs(i,j),Iu(i,j)); 
 
IfThen2(i,j).. BigM*(Iu(i,j)$arcs(i,j))=g=current(i,j)$arcs(i,j); 
Model BinaryModel/ ObjI, IfThen2 /; 
Solve BinaryModel using mip minimizing zz ; 
 
************************************************************************ 
******* 
************************************************************************ 
******* 
 
************************************************************************ 
******* 
 
Variables 
zzz objective function; 
 
Positive Variables 
newflow(i,j)  suppliers next move 
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y(i,j) interdiction arc choice 
Cattackplus"Over Deviation of Interdiction Cost Goal" 
Cattackminus "Under Deviation of Interdiction Cost Goal" 
Dattackplus "Over Deviation of Damage Goal" 
Dattackminus "Under Deviation of Damage Goal"; 
 
Parameters 
Cgoal interdiction goal 
Dgoal destruction interdiction goal 
Iup(i,j); 
 
Scalar 
r   resouce limit; 
 
*Parameter definition 
 
r= INSERT DATA HERE  ; 
Cgoal = INSERT DATA HERE ; 
Dgoal =  INSERT DATA HERE ; 
Iup(i,j)=Iu.l(i,j); 
Equations 
Obj2 objective function 
Interdict interdiction of flow 
NewPick(i) Suppliers new choice 
FlowLimit2(i,j) Upper bound on flow 
Budget2 Budget or Cost goal 
ReliabilityG2  Rel goal 
TaskLT2 Time Goal 
InterdictLimit(i,j) 
InterdictionCost Cost to Interdict 
DamageGoal Interdiciton damage goal; 
 
Obj2.. zzz=e= INSERT DATA HERE ; 
 
Interdict.. sum(arcs(i,j),Iup(i,j)*y(i,j))=e=r; 
 
NewPick(i).. sum(j,Iup(i,j)*(newflow(i,j)$arcs(i,j)-y(i,j)$arcs(i,j))+(1- 
Iup(i,j))*newflow(i,j)$arcs(i,j))-sum(j,loss(j,i)*((Iup(j,i)*(newflow(j,i)$arcs(j,i)- 
y(j,i)$arcs(j,i))+(1-Iup(j,i))*newflow(j,i)$arcs(j,i))))=l=b(i); 
 
ReliabilityG2.. sum(arcs(i,j),reliability(i,j)*(newflow(i,j)-y(i,j)$arcs(i,j)))+RMinus- 
Rplus=e=ReliabilityGoal; 
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Budget2.. sum(arcs(i,j),cost(i,j)*newflow(i,j))+CMinus-Cplus=e=CostGoal; 
TaskLT2.. sum(arcs(i,j),time(i,j)*newflow(i,j))+Tminus-Tplus=e=TimeGoal; 
FlowLimit2(i,j)..     newflow(i,j)$arcs(i,j)=l=u(i,j)$arcs(i,j); 
InterdictLimit(i,j).. y(i,j)$arcs(i,j)=l=current(i,j)$arcs(i,j); 
InterdictionCost.. sum(arcs(i,j),interdiction_cost(i,j)*y(i,j)$arcs(i,j))+Cattackminus- 
Cattackplus=e=Cgoal; 
DamageGoal.. sum(arcs(i,j),damage(i,j)*y(i,j)$arcs(i,j))+Dattackminus- 
Dattackplus=e=Dgoal; 
Model SCNFI / Obj2, Interdict, NewPick, FlowLimit2, ReliabilityG2, TaskLT2, 
Budget2, InterdictLimit, InterdictionCost, DamageGoal /; 
 
Solve SCNFI using mip minimizing zzz ; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analyzing the Critical Supply Chain 
For Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
 
 
Problem Statement 
The purpose of this research is to provide a suite of 
scalable models to both develop a friendly supply chain 
and to propose attack vectors for an opposition’s supply 
chain. The framework allows the analyst the ability to 
investigate an array of options and suggest an 
opposition’s most likely course of actions. 
 
Research Questions 
• How can an analyst model optimal UAS supply chain 
design? 
• How can an analyst model the best UAS supply chain 
interdiction? 
• How can a decision maker strategize UAS supply 
chain interdiction? 
 
Methodology Framework 
Supply Chain Interdiction Methodology (SCIM) 
 
Phase 1: 
1Lt Megan Muniz 
Advisor: Dr. Richard F. Deckro 
Committee Member: Dr. Brian J. Lunday 
Department of Operational Sciences (ENS) 
Air Force Institute of  Technology 
 
  
 
Illustrative Example for SCNF and SCNF-I 
 
     Optimal Supply Chain Before Interdiction  
 
Model Descriptions 
• Linear programming and generalized 
network flow models that incorporate goal 
programming are developed to integrate the 
decision maker’s priorities. 
• SS models the optimal supplier choices that 
a manufacturer would select 
• SCNF models the optimal flow of 
materials through a manufacturer’s supply 
chain 
• SS-I models the optimal interdiction of a 
selected supplier set 
• SCNF-I models the optimal interdiction of a 
manufacturer’s flow of materials 
• HOT allows an interdiction planning team 
to systematically consider important aspects 
of a supply chain interdiction and 
synthesize a coherent strategy 
Significance of Research 
• First attempt to incorporate goal 
programming with supply chain 
SCIM- 
Design 
 
Phase 2: 
SCIM- 
Interdiction 
 
Phase 3: 
SCIM- 
Strategize 
• OEM Supplier Selection (SS) 
• Supply Chain Network Flow (SCNF) 
 
 
• Supplier Selection Interdiction (SS-I) 
• Supply Chain Network Flow Interdiction (SCNF-I) 
 
 
• House of Targeting (HOT) 
 
 
 
Software Utilized 
 
 
 
      Optimal Supply Chain After Interdiction  
interdiction, especially applied to 
supplier selection and generalized 
network flows 
• The flexibility of the models provide 
the decision maker with a vast amount 
of options in their employment of the 
methodology. 
Future Work 
• Explore transforming demand 
constraint from SCNF into goal 
• MATLAB to read data and write GAMS file 
• GAMS invoking CPLEX to solve goal programs 
constraint 
• Sensitivity analysis on manufacturer 
and attacker priorities 
• Apply models to real supply chain data 
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A
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